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Abstract
In 2008, most U.S. airlines implemented checked baggage fee policies to generate
additional revenue to help with their financial distress caused by abnormally high
fuel prices. Since this time, the fees have provided a steady revenue stream and
often are the difference between a profit and a loss. Recently, some literature in the
operations management field has postulated that altering consumer behavior in a
manner that is beneficial to both the firm and customers is an additional purpose
of these fees. In Essay 1, we empirically investigate the airline perspective of this
hypothesis by considering the operational impact of airline baggage fees as measured
by the airlines’ departure delays. We do so by using primarily data collected by the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics for the time periods immediately before and after
fees for one and two checked bags were imposed by most U.S. airlines in 2008, and
using a Tobit regression model to assess the impact of the fees on departure time
performance. According to the 2013 North America Airline Satisfaction Study by J.D.
Power & Associates, the baggage fees are still a source of passenger dissatisfaction. In
Essay 2, we empirically investigate the customer perspective of the above hypothesis
by considering the benefits provided by the service of checking bags. Thus, we
examine airline service attributes that affect customer choice itinerary, and how
checking or not checking bags influence these relationships, by employing discrete
choice models estimated on stated-preference survey data.
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In the early 2008 the U.S. airlines were struggling with severe financial pressure due
especially to record fuel prices. For competitive reasons, they had not been able
to raise ticket prices enough to offset that increasing expense. Consequently, the
airlines were trying to both reduce costs and add new revenues such as charging
for products and services that once were complimentary, moving customers to “a la
carte” pricing. United Airlines’ move of imposing a fee on the second bag checked
by its passengers led to an industry shift as the competitors mimicked it. Soon
after, checking two 50-pound suitcases free of charge was not the industry standard
anymore. The financial implications were immediate, with U.S. airlines collecting in
2008 more than $1 billion in baggage fees, which represents a 148% increase from
2007.
Even though fuel prices receded, baggage fees have remained to boost the airline
industry’s usually poor finances. As recently as 2012, the baggage fees amounted to
$3.5 billion, or 3.8% increase compared to 2011, when the baggage fees generated
approximately one-half of the industry’s profit of $7 billion [BTS, 2013]. Given that
in 2012 only 0.8% more total system passengers were carried by U.S. airlines than in
2011 [BTS Press Release, March 2013], we can conclude the growing acceptance of
baggage fees by travelers.
However, a significant increase in the amount of carry-on baggage as a direct
result of passengers avoiding the checked baggage fees has also been documented
[U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010]. Dinkar [2010] reports the concerns of
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flight attendants over the more and heavier carry-on baggage brought into the cabin,
which leads to an increase in the amount of bags checked at the gate when there is no
room for them in the cabin, and subsequent delays that occur from the process. In
20071 flight delays were estimated to have raised the operating costs of U.S. airlines
by $19 billion [Joint Economic Committee, 2008], being thus a big burden to airlines’
profits [Bishop, Rupp, and Zheng, 2011]. If the checked baggage fees are seen as
an additional cause of flight delays due to excessive carry-on baggage, they should
provide the necessary impetus for airlines to reconsider them.
Thus, in Essay 1 we examine the operational impact of airline baggage fees as
measured by departure delays, by using primarily data collected by the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics. More specifically, we use data on 1,929,733 domestic flights
flown by Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines,
US Airways, American Airlines, AirTran Airways, JetBlue Airways and Southwest
Airlines, starting with 35 days prior to the date when the fees for one checked bag were
implemented and continuing until 35 days after the implementation of two checked
bags fees. We supplement this data with data published by the Federal Aviation
Administration and the National Climatic Data Center of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and use regression analyses to examine the impact of
implementing checked baggage fees on departure delay performance.
While recognizing the main purpose of the baggage fees, the literature (e.g. Allon,
Bassamboo, and Lariviere [2011]) has postulated that:
“[B]aggage fees are not just about revenue. They serve to alter consumer
behavior in a manner that is beneficial to both the firm and customers.
The firm enjoys lower costs (...)”
1The fees for one, respectively two checked bags were gradually implemented by most U.S.
airlines in 2008, starting May 5th.
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That is, because offering the service of checking bags adds additional costs to
the airlines, one approach taken by airlines in order to lower their costs has been
to discourage travelers from checking bags by implementing checked baggage fees,
which some have argued would also benefit travelers. Yet, the recent 2013 North
America Airline Satisfaction Study by J.D. Power & Associates has revealed that
“[b]aggage fees continue to be a source of passenger dissatisfaction and to lead to lower
satisfaction levels” [J.D. Power & Associates Press Release, May 2013]. Consequently,
it remains to be shown what benefits the service of checking bags provides, beyond
the increase in revenues from the fees, as previously mentioned.
Thus, in Essay 2 we explore a potential new way of segmenting travelers based
on their sensitivities to itinerary attributes. More specifically, we investigate
whether travelers who check bags and travelers who do not check bags have different
sensitivities to the historical on-time performance, total travel time, airfare and
number of connections when choosing an itinerary. This is particularly relevant as
most major airlines are evaluating operational changes that may make the process of
checking bags even more inconvenient than it currently is. In this essay, we use data
from an Internet-based stated-preference survey conducted by Resource Systems
Group, Inc. in the Spring of 2012, who surveyed 878 U.S. domestic travelers who
had flown a domestic flight within the last six months, and employ discrete choice
modeling.
Through empirically evaluating these two issues using secondary and primary data
sources, this dissertation will help explicate the airlines’ perspective of the impact of
the checked baggage fees implemented by most U.S. airlines in 2008, and travelers’
perspective with regard to itinerary-choice, given that they check bags or not.
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Chapter 2
Do Bags Fly Free? An Empirical Analysis of
the Operational Implications of Airline
Baggage Fees
2.1 Introduction
The once industry standard of two 50-pound free checked bags is now virtually extinct
in the domestic U.S. airline market. Today, most U.S. airlines charge fees for checking
a bag. On February 10th 2007 Spirit Airlines, an ultra low-cost carrier, became the
first airline to charge for one checked bag (i.e. the second checked bag fee), a policy
that was extended to two checked bags (i.e., by adding the first checked bag fee) on
June 19th, 2007. United Airlines was the first major U.S. carrier that announced a
fee for one checked bag1, which was estimated to generate cost savings and additional
revenue of more than $100 million annually [Carey, 2008]. Citing high fuel prices,
large carriers such as Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, and
US Airways quickly matched United’s decision and all began charging their passengers
for one checked bag (i.e. the second checked bag fee) starting May 5th, 2008. A week
later, American Airlines matched the other airlines’ baggage policy and, on June 15th,
started charging its passengers for two checked bags (i.e. by adding the first checked
bag fee), hoping to get more than $350 million in additional revenues [McCartney,
1Unless the travelers had elite status in its Mileage Plus frequent-flyer program.
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2008b]. By the end of 2008, all major U.S. carriers except Alaska Airlines, JetBlue
Airways, and Southwest Airlines2 had instituted fees for the first two checked bags.
The financial implications were immediate, with U.S. airlines collecting more than
one billion dollars in baggage fees for overweight, oversized and/or extra bags in 2008,
which represents a 148% increase from 2007 [BTS, 2012]. Expressed as a percentage
of operating revenues, baggage fees increased from 0.27% in 2007 to 0.62% in 2008 for
U.S. airlines (reaching 1.94% in 2010), generating a sustainable source of revenues. In
the first half of 2012, the industry set a new record by collecting $1.7 billion in baggage
fees [Mayerowitz, 2012]. Ignoring these potential financial gains, the no-fee policy was
used as part of its marketing strategy by Southwest Airlines which saw an opportunity
to distinguish itself from the competition by launching its “Fees Don’t Fly With Us”
campaign. This marketing campaign has been viewed as successful by Southwest, as
they continue to be the only major U.S. airline that does not charge a fee for the
first two checked bags. This policy indicates that they view the marginal increase in
revenue from the increased volume of passengers generated by the campaign as being
larger than the loss in potential revenue from charging the fees and any associated
cost increases. Their decision has not gone unquestioned, however, as stock analysts
have repeatedly suggested that they begin charging for checked bags in order to raise
additional revenues.
While the baggage fee policies are now generally agreed upon as a successful
way of improving revenues for both the airlines that started charging for checked
bags, as well as those that did not (Southwest), the question still remains about
the impact the policies have had on airlines’ operations such as on-time departure
performance. At the aggregate level (i.e. all U.S. airlines and airports), the percentage
of delayed departures remained constant over the 2007-2008 period, according to
2Alaska Airlines instituted the first two checked bags fees policy on July 7th, 2009; JetBlue
Airways has only charged for one checked bag as of 2012, i.e. starting June 1st, 2008; Southwest
Airlines has not charged for the first two checked bags as of 2012.
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the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS). Aggregate statistics, however, may disguise the impact at the individual airline
level. Thus, it is worthwhile to evaluate whether a marketing strategy decision such
as charging or not charging fees for one or two checked bags has had implications on
an airline’s operational performance.
As pointed out in the popular press [Johnsson and Hilkevitch, 2011], Southwest
had to cope with a surge in checked baggage, a byproduct of its “Bags Fly Free”
marketing campaign. Transferring bags between flights under an extreme time crunch
is perhaps the most challenging aspect of running an airport hub and a common cause
of delays. Departure delays at Midway airport for Southwest Airlines were reported
to increase after the checked baggage fee implementation by other airlines. Ryanair,
an Irish low-cost airline, claims that baggage fees are a necessity in order to keep costs
down, and it has been popularly hypothesized that if Southwest is going to welcome
free checked bags, they have to expect higher costs [Lariviere, 2011]. On the other
hand, to avoid baggage fees, passengers have continued to bulk up their carry-on bags,
turning the allotment of one bag and a purse or briefcase into a two-suitcase load.
Some game the system by fully intending to check a bag – they volunteer at the gate
instead of the counter, and thus avoid the airline fee [McCartney, 2012a]. Baggage fees
have made the overhead bin a precious commodity and the accompanying boarding
stampede can increase departure delays. Thus, whether baggage fees lead to increased
departure delays for the carrier that charges fees, or does not charge fees, is an
empirical question that we seek to answer.
That a firm will perform better if it links its operations strategy to the
competitive strategy to achieve the so-called external fit, is well established in the
operations strategy literature [Smith and Reece, 1999]. Moreover, the alignment
between operations and marketing strategies should exist to benefit organizational
performance [Roth and Van Der Velde, 1991, Rhee and Mehra, 2006]. In a special
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issue on this topic, Malhotra and Sharma [2002, p. 210] note that “managing the
interface between the marketing and operations functions is a challenging task
since these two functional areas may often have conflicting objectives and plans
of action. Yet co-ordination between them is critical for firm success”. Thus, the
implementation of checked bag fees (a marketing decision) provides an ideal setting
to study how an industry changed, or coordinated, their operations to respond to
this marketing strategy change.
To empirically address the impact of baggage fees in the airline industry, we
primarily use data collected by the BTS for the time periods immediately before
and after fees for one and two checked bags were imposed by the majority of
the U.S. airlines. We supplement this data with data published by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and use regression
analyses to examine the impact of implementing checked baggage fees on departure
delay performance. We collected data on 1,929,733 domestic flights flown by
Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, US
Airways, American Airlines, AirTran Airways, JetBlue Airways and Southwest
Airlines, starting with 35 days prior to the date when the fees for one checked bag
were implemented and continuing until 35 days after the implementation of two
checked bags fees. Since Southwest Airlines is the only major U.S. airline that
does not charge for two checked bags, it resembles a control variable of operational
performance in a quasi-experiment3 when compared against competing airlines (that
did begin charging for checked bags) that operated in the same airports.
3In a true experimental study, the treatment group receives the intervention, while the control
group receives the usual conditions, meaning they only receive interventions that they would
have gotten if they had not participated in the study. As Southwest Airlines might have gotten
new customers who used to fly the now-baggage fee charging airlines, we do not have a true
experiment, and consequently we do not employ a traditional difference-in-difference approach [Card
and Krueger, 1994] in our analysis.
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Our focus is on the operational impact of airline baggage fees instituted by most
U.S. airlines in 2008. More specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:
Do baggage fees impact airline operations as measured by departure delays? Is there
a differential impact of one checked bag fee and two checked bags fees policies? Did
airlines increase or decrease scheduled block-times in anticipation/response to the
impact of baggage fees?
We show that, at the aggregate level, the airlines that began charging for one
checked bag saw a significant relative improvement in their on-time departure
performance in the 35-day period afterwards, compared to the airlines that were
not charging for a checked bag during the same time period. When grouped into
‘low-cost’ versus ‘legacy’ carriers, however, we find opposite effects: the departure
performance of the low-cost airlines became worse while it improved for the legacy
carriers. When the airlines began charging for two checked bags, we find no significant
change in departure performance of legacy carriers, but a degradation of departure
performance of low-cost carriers. These findings indicate that the baggage fees did
influence customer behavior, but in the case of charging for both checked bags, not in
the direction the airlines had hoped for. The degradation of departure performance
appears to be especially bad for the low-cost carriers, as it appears that their more
price sensitive passengers may have begun carrying on more baggage to avoid the
checked bag fees. Thus, our findings also support the notion that Southwest’s
marketing strategy of being the only major U.S. airline not charging for the first two
checked bags is in line with their historical operations oriented strategy.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review
the related literature on on-time performance and baggage fees. Section 3 describes
the hypotheses of this study. Section 4 explains the data, variables and empirical




This paper relates to two streams of research in economics and operations
management: (1) research that uses data provided by the DOT to investigate
the impact of various factors on the quality dimension of airline’s operational
performance, as measured by on-time departures, on-time arrivals, and flight
cancellations, and the impact of service quality dimensions on financial performance,
and (2) research that examines the consequences of implementing baggage fees.
Within the first stream, economics researchers have looked at the impact of
competition on airline service quality. Prince and Simon [2009] use BTS data on 10
major airlines in the 1995-2001 period on Fridays on the 1,000 busiest routes, and
find that multimarket contact has a positive effect on arrival delays, causing delays
on the ground, more in the form of gate departure delays rather than time spent on
the runway. Using over 800,000 individual flights scheduled between 50 major U.S.
airports in January, April, and July of 2000, Mazzeo [2003] finds that the prevalence
and duration of arrival delays are significantly greater on routes where only one airline
provides direct service, and that weather, congestion, and scheduling decisions have
a significant contribution to arrival delays.
Using over 27,000 monthly route observations between 1997 to 2000, Rupp,
Owens, and Plumly [2006] find that less competitive routes are characterized by lower
service quality, in terms of both more frequent and longer flight delays. Further,
Rupp [2009] examines the effect of competitive, economic, logistical, and weather
measures on flight delays, by using 505,127 domestic flights between January 1995
and December 2004. He finds that airlines do not internalize passenger delay costs
as departure and arrival delays are more likely at highly concentrated airports, and
that the local market competition improves on-time performance, delays being more
prevalent on monopoly routes. Rupp and Holmes [2006] examine the effect of the
same measures on flight cancellations, by using 1,447,096 domestic flights in the
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U.S. between January 1995 and August 2001. Their findings indicate that route
competition improves service quality as measured by cancellation rates, and that
flight cancellations are independent of airport concentration. They also identify a
hub airline effect for both origin and destination airports that lowers the frequency
of cancelled flights. Further, Rupp and Sayanak [2008] use 1,065,953 domestic flights
of twenty-one U.S. carriers in 2006, and find that low-cost carriers have slightly
shorter arrival delays (about one minute) than their competitors. In our study we
also differentiate between legacy and low-cost carriers, and control for weather and
logistical aspects. However, to control for the propagation of flight delays, unlike
Rupp and colleagues who use a measure of scheduled departure time, we use a
spillover-adjusted measure of departure delay in addition to our measure of scheduled
departure time (i.e., departure block time). Unlike this previous literature, we use a
Tobit regression model, which is more appropriate for measuring departure delay as
a left-censored dependent variable. Thus, our study adds a robustness check to the
earlier results. Finally, other economics researchers (e.g., Mayer and Sinai [2003],
Forbes and Lederman [2010], Ater and Orlov [2011]) have investigated the impact
of factors such as hub origin, vertical integration with regional partners to operate
flights, and Internet access on departure delays, but these factors are not relevant
for our objective.
In the operations management literature, Ramdas, Williams, Li, and Lipson
[2012] examine the relationship between performance along several dimensions of
service quality, including on-time performance, long delays, and cancellations, and
stock market performance, by using monthly data for eleven major U.S. airlines
over a 20-year period. They find that unexpected changes in service quality have
a contemporaneous impact on stock returns, and that the cost of flight delays is
convex in time. They also estimate a conservative marginal cost of a delay as being
$150 per minute. Other researchers have used the DOT data to study the impact of
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operational aspects of running an airline on airline service quality. Li and Netessine
[2011] consider that airline alliances provide higher service quality in the form of
more options, smoother connections, shared alliance lounges, and flexibility regarding
frequent flyer programs. Others equate higher quality with on-time performance.
For example, Ramdas and Williams [2008] investigate the tradeoff between aircraft
capacity utilization and on-time performance using flights flown within the continental
U.S. in the years 1995-2005. They find that greater aircraft utilization results in
higher delays, with this effect being worse for airlines that are close to their asset
frontiers in terms of already being at high levels of aircraft utilization. Deshpande
and Arıkan [2012] examine the impact of the airline flight schedules on on-time
arrival performance. They use 20,681,160 flights covering 294 U.S. airports in the
years 2005-2007 to provide a method for forecasting the scheduled on-time arrival
probability for each individual scheduled domestic flight in the U.S. They find that
revenue drivers, competitive measures, and operational characteristics such as the
hub and spoke network structure have a significant effect on the scheduled on-time
arrival probability. In addition, they find that, unlike low-cost airlines, full-service
airlines assign a higher weight on the cost of late arrivals. Using the same dataset,
Arıkan, Deshpande, and Sohoni [2012] develop stochastic models to analyze the
propagation of delays through air-transportation networks. They find that the actual
block times averages of all U.S. airlines exceed their average scheduled block times,
potentially driven by the 15-minute buffer used by the DOT in reporting on-time
arrival performance. They also construct a measure for “passenger” on-time arrival
probability, in addition to the flight on-time arrival performance currently reported
by the DOT. Our study contributes to this research stream by including a new
possible factor that influences departure delays, i.e. charging for checked bags. More
specifically, we study how a marketing strategy decision such as charging or not
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charging passengers for one, and respectively two checked bags, impacts airline service
quality as measured by on-time departures.
Within the second research stream, Allon, Bassamboo, and Lariviere [2011]
analytically examine whether airlines should bundle the main service (i.e. transporting
a person) and an ancillary service such as transporting a checked bag, and if
they should post a single price or unbundle them and price the ancillary service
separately. Their modeling approach indicates that the way in which airlines have
been implementing baggage fees has more direct impact on controlling customer
behavior than segmenting customers. Our study is the first to show empirically
that baggage fees do seem to have influenced customer behavior, and that the effect
depends on the type of airline. Unlike Allon, Bassamboo, and Lariviere [2011] who
posit that pricing the baggage separately induces customers to exert effort (i.e.,
to reduce the volume of checked baggage) and thus lowers the airline’s costs, we
find that this practice also induces customers to increase the volume of carry-on
baggage, which does not lower the airline’s costs. Using an event study methodology,
Barone, Henrickson, and Voy [2012] explore the impact of the first checked bag fee
announcements on airline stock prices. They find negative abnormal returns on the
day of announcement for the announcing airline and other competing airlines, since
perceived as an industry weakness. On the other hand, they find that subsequent
announcements of fee increases for the first checked bag are correlated with positive
abnormal returns, justified by investors learning the revenue implication of these
baggage fees that have positively impacted the airline’s financial performance. Using
a spatial autoregressive model to account for airport substitutability, Henrickson and
Scott [2012] consider the top 150 domestic routes from 2007 to 2009, and find that
a one dollar increase in baggage fees reduces airline ticket prices on the fee charging
airlines by $0.24 and increases Southwest Airlines’ ticket prices on routes in which
they compete with baggage fee charging airlines by $0.73. Thus, their results indicate
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very little difference between the change in total customer costs on the airlines that
charge baggage fees versus Southwest. Our study also contributes to this research
stream, by linking baggage fees directly to an airline’s operational costs.
2.3 Hypothesis Development
Due to severe financial pressures in 2008, especially increased jet fuel prices, the
majority of the U.S. airlines stripped out previously free services and began charging
customers for anything more than basic transportation. While customers adapted to
most of these changes, the implementation of checked bags fee tested the boundaries of
what a basic airline service was. As United Airlines’ Senior VP of Marketing explained
in 2008, “the definition of basic airline service is evolving, and different airlines today
have different answers of what comes standard with a ticket. “Unbundling” services
means travelers will pay only for what they use. Currently, every customer pays
for baggage service, whether used or not. We believe it has been too much of a
one-size-fits-all model. (...) the baggage decision was difficult because changing
customer expectations is obviously difficult” [McCartney, 2008a]. Indeed, the U.S.
airlines saw competitive concerns as the deciding factor in implementing à-la-carte
pricing regarding checked baggage. If they began charging for bags, a service that
had been long built into the ticket price, they would start to lose business among the
price-sensitive, non-elite frequent flyers. However, once Spirit Airlines, the “ultra-low
cost airline”, successfully experimented with fees for checked bags, most U.S. airlines
followed it. The current theory does not clearly predict the effect of baggage fees
on departure delays. We speculate that the imposition of baggage fees (of similar $
value for all airlines) caused passengers to change their behavior, and thus impacted
departure delays, as follows:
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Let x1 and x2 represent the percentage of passengers who travel by checking in
one and two bags respectively4. When the airlines which previously had not charged
their passengers for the first two pieces of checked baggage instituted a policy change
by charging for one checked bag (see Table 2.2 for exact dates), the x1 passengers
were not affected. However, x2 passengers’ behavior was affected, and depending on
their price sensitivity, they chose one of the following three options: (1) paying the
fee for one checked bag while checking the other bag for free, (2) checking only one
bag (instead of two) and thus not paying the fee, hence turning into the x1 type
of passengers, or (3) switching to a carrier which did not implement such a policy.
Let y1, y2, and y3 represent the percentage of x2 passengers who chose the first,
second and third option respectively. While y1 and y2 passengers did not switch to
a carrier without such a baggage policy, overall they contributed to a decline in the
checked baggage load of those airlines which implemented such a policy. That is,
when faced with a fee for checked baggage, passengers checked 40 to 50 percent fewer
bags on some carriers [U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010]. Moreover, y2
passengers may have brought on board a larger carry-on to make up for the “loss” of
one bag. Indeed, checked baggage fees led to more and heavier bags brought as carry-
on into the cabin [Dinkar, 2010]. The existing carry-on baggage limits were not always
enforced. Related to the increase of carry-on baggage, a survey of the Association
of Flight Attendants show an increase in tense boarding situations, the number of
checked bags at the gate and pushback delays [U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2010]. Consequently, the implementation of checked baggage fees resulted in reduced
4We assume that these two categories describe the most typical passengers, and thus the most
relevant for the purpose of our study. While passengers can travel with a carry-on bag only, we
believe that they would also check in one or two bags as long as there are no additional fees imposed
by the airline. The passengers can also check more than two bags, however these extra-bags have
always incurred additional fees, thus our discussion reduces to their behavior regarding the first two
checked bags. Also, the passengers who are insensitive to baggage fees (e.g. elite frequent flyers,
business travelers, those who do not check in bags) are not affected by the fees instituted on one or
two checked bags, and thus this customer segment is irrelevant for the purpose of our study.
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likelihood of on-time departures as long as the carry-on baggage limits were loosely
enforced. The popular press describes the real-estate crisis in the plane through as
follows:
“For many travelers, the most odious aspect of the baggage fee is
the anticipated battle for overhead-bin space. To make sure they can
find room, some customers already push their way through boarding
queues. Passengers struggle to stuff large bags into small bins, and flight
attendants often find themselves taking bags off planes and checking them
to their destinations once bins fill up. All this will likely get worse, though
the airlines say that the new fee won’t be collected in airplane cabins
from customers who can’t find space for their allowed carry-on bags. Bin
battles can delay flights and leave customers frustrated.” [McCartney,
2008b]
In this vein, Spirit Airlines, the airline that initiated the checked bag fees in
the U.S., started charging fees for carry-on baggage in 2010. They estimated that
charging for carry-on baggage would eliminate the gate delay caused by gate-checking
for carry-on bags that do not fit in the overhead bins. Spirit Airlines estimated
savings of five minutes per flight5 or 20 hours of airplane time per day, which was the
equivalent of two extra planes which cost about $40 million each [McCartney, 2010a].
On the other hand, the switching behavior of the y3 passengers caused those
carriers which did not have the one checked bag fee in place, to experience higher
checked baggage volume. This higher volume brought about additional challenges,
as “[m]oving passenger baggage is an intensely manual operation, requiring lots of
workers. On average, each bag gets touched by about 10 workers during its journey.
Once bags are tagged, they are sorted and placed on carts, then driven planeside,
5According to Spirit Airlines’ CEO, each flight has saved, on average, five to six minutes spent
checking bags at gates [McCartney, 2012a].
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where a crew loads them into the belly of a jet. The unloading process is more labor-
intensive: Bags are sorted into luggage to be delivered to the carousel for passengers
to collect and luggage that needs to be routed to connecting flights and has to be
sorted and driven to lots of different planes” [McCartney, 2008d]. As the US Airways’
VP of Customer Service Planning simply put it, “[t]he art, or science, of handling
bags is really more complex than people realize” [McCartney, 2008d]. Moreover, the
correlation between on-time dependability and amount of baggage checked has been
pointed out by the American Airlines’ VP of Airport Services [McCartney, 2008c].
Thus, reducing the volume of checked bags should increase the likelihood of on-time
departure. Therefore, we hypothesize that an airline that charges its passengers for
baggage may have a reduced volume of checked bags and thus reduced likelihood of
departure delay. On the other hand, an airline that does not charge its passengers
for baggage may have a high volume of checked bags and thus its flights are more
likely to depart later than their scheduled departure times. Indeed, the distribution
of x and y passengers (as described before) plays an important role in the operational
impact of baggage fees. Because the theory does not provide a clear direction, we let
the data dictate the correct hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1A. Better relative performance as measured by departure delays is
achieved when charging for one checked bag versus not charging for a checked bag.
Hypothesis 1B. Worse relative performance as measured by departure delays is
achieved when charging for one checked bag versus not charging for a checked bag.
Further, when the airlines which were charging their passengers for one checked
bag instituted a policy change by charging the first two checked bags (see Table 2.2
for exact dates), both x2 and x1 passengers were affected, depending on their price
sensitivity. Regarding x2, their y1 subset of passengers (previously defined) faced the
following options: (1) paying the fees for the first two checked bags, (2) instead of
two bags, checking only one bag (thus turning into x1 passengers) and paying for it,
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and potentially having a bigger carry-on bag to make up for one bag, or (3) switching
to a carrier which did not implement such a policy. The y2 subset, as previously
mentioned, identifies with x1 passengers, who have the following options: (1) checking
one bag and paying for it, (2) not checking the bag as it is a carry-on bag, or (3)
switching to a carrier which did not implement such a policy.
Let z represent the percentage of x1 passengers who switch to a carrier which did
not institute the above mentioned policy. If z is large, then we hypothesize that the
departure delays encountered by the airlines without fees for the first two checked
bags exceed the departure delays of those airlines which have a one checked bag fee
policy, which in turn are larger than the departure delays of the airlines which do
charge fees for the first two checked bags. Let f and g represent the percentage of
x1 passengers who pay the fee for their one checked bag and those who do not pay
the fee as their bag is a carry-on. If g is large, we expect the departure delays of the
airlines charging fees for the first two checked bags to be larger than the departure
delays of the airlines with a single checked bag fee policy, which in turn exceeds the
departure delays of the airlines without fees for the first two checked bags. Regarding
the larger carry-on bag that passengers might have considered to make up for the
“loss” of a free checked bag (i.e. either the second or the first checked bag), we expect
passengers to exhibit a more pronounced behavior change when facing a change in
baggage policy from one checked bag fee to two checked bags fees, rather than from
no checked bag fee to one checked bag fee. That is, we expect an incremental impact
of implementing fees for the first two checked bags over implementing fees for only
one checked bag.
Similar to the one checked bag fee policy, the theory does not offer a clear direction
of the impact of the first two checked bags fees policy on departure delays, and hence
we let the data dictate the correct hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2A. Better relative performance as measured by departure delays is
achieved when charging for the first two checked bags versus charging only for one
checked bag.
Hypothesis 2B. Worse relative performance as measured by departure delays is
achieved when charging for the first two checked bags versus charging only for one
checked bag.
It is understood that the new policies on checked baggage, motivated by poor
financial performance, required strategic decisions at the carrier level, given the
unknown impact it would have on passengers and on the entire industry. As “service
factories” [Schmenner, 1986], the airlines were facing another challenge in providing
their services as reliably and rapidly as possible. American Airlines declared: “[we]
took extraordinary pains to prepare for the step. We did a lot of research on how our
customers would be impacted. We did a lot of preparation with our airport people
and our flight attendants” [Field, 2009]. United Airlines acknowledged a potential
drawback, given the exemptions accompanying the policies: “determining passengers’
mileage status and ticket types could require more interaction with airline agents”
[McCartney, 2008d]. It seems obvious that a decision of such caliber required closer
coordination and communication within airlines, especially between the marketing
and operations functions. Given the expected disruptions in the boarding process,
we expect airlines allocate more slack in their scheduled block times6 to make up
for departure delays and still arrive on-time, according to the DOT performance
metrics. However, this practice of adding minutes to schedules7 comes at a high cost
to airlines: “Pilot-and flight-attendant costs increase since many are paid based on
6The scheduled block time is the difference between the scheduled arrival time and the scheduled
departure time of a flight.
7Other reasons offered by airlines for this practice are increased congestion at the airports
and in the sky, high fuel prices that force airlines to slow cruising speeds for savings, and lack of
modern equipment for air-traffic controllers that prevents flights from taking the most direct routes
[McCartney, 2007].
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scheduled time. Maintenance costs rise since many functions are based on how many
hours that engines and airplanes are in service. Inefficient schedules can even mean
more planes are needed to fly the same schedule” [McCartney, 2007]. It also hurts
passengers, who value the most realistic schedules. That is, while from the planning
perspective the increased scheduled block time is viewed as a waste of resources, from
the operational perspective it becomes an opportunity to absorb disruption and avoid
its propagation. Hence, given the previously hypothesized departure performances
(i.e. both worse and better) triggered by implementing checked bags fees policies,
we let the data dictate the correct hypothesis for the impact of these policies on the
scheduled block time:
Hypothesis 3A. As the checked baggage fee policy gets implemented from zero
to one to two bags, the scheduled block time increases.
Hypothesis 3B. As the checked baggage fee policy gets implemented from zero
to one to two bags, the scheduled block time decreases.
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Data and Variables
The main data source is BTS’ Airline On-Time Performance data, which includes
flight information of all major U.S. airlines that have at least 1 percent of total
domestic scheduled-service passenger revenues. The data cover nonstop scheduled-
service flights between points within the U.S., and include detailed departure and
arrival statistics by airport and airline, such as: scheduled and actual departure and
arrival times, departure and arrival delays, origin and destination airports, flight
numbers, flight date, one-hour time block based on the scheduled departure/arrival
time (e.g. 6:00am-6:59am), cancelled or diverted flights, taxi-out and taxi-in times,
air time, tail number of the aircraft that flew the flight etc. Thus, our unit of analysis
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is an individual flight from its origin airport to the destination airport operated by
its carrier on a given day at a particular time.
An ideal setup for understanding how the implementation of checked bags fees
affects departure performance would be an experiment where, for the same time
period and at the same airports, some airlines charge their passengers for their
baggage while others do not. Because we focus only on the airports used by Southwest
Airlines, which did not impose fees on the first two checked bags (unless they
exceeded the maximum weight limit), our research employs a quasi-experiment that
approximates the ideal setting. For our comparison set, we included all U.S. airlines
with greater than $2B in annual revenues in 2008, i.e. Continental Airlines, Delta Air
Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, American Airlines, JetBlue
Airways8 and AirTran Airways. All but AirTran Airways and JetBlue Airways are
considered “legacy” U.S. airlines (airlines that were operating before the deregulation
of the industry in 1978). Notably, for our purposes, we use Southwest Airlines to
approximate the ideal setup where some randomly selected flights encounter fees for
two pieces of baggage whereas others do not and thus constitute the “control” group.
In our study, Southwest flights act as a pseudo-control for trends and unobservable
factors that can also affect flight delays in addition to baggage fees and other
observable factors such as congestion. For a meaningful comparison, we restricted
our analysis to the 57 origin airports used simultaneously by Southwest Airlines
and one or more of the other airlines (see Table 2.1). These airports constitute
a representative sample of Southwest’s airports, i.e. 89% of the total number of
airports used by Southwest in 2008.
8We performed analysis by first excluding, and later including, JetBlue Airways because the
timing of their implementation of one checked bag fee overlaps with the timing of other airlines’
implementation of two checked bags fees. Thus, we cannot isolate the impact of the one checked
baggage fee for JetBlue Airways. Also, JetBlue Airways has not charged for two checked bags fees
as of 2012.
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Table 2.1 The 57 origin airports used by Southwest Airlines and the other airlines
in our datasets
Airport Airport Airport Airport
Code Name Code Name
ABQ Albuquerque International Sunport, Albuquerque, NM MSY Louis Armstrong New Orleans International, New Orleans, LA
ALB Albany International, Albany, NY OAK Oakland International, Oakland, CA
AUS Austin-Bergstrom International, Austin, TX OKC Will Rogers World, Oklahoma City, OK
BDL Bradley International, Hartford, CT OMA Eppley, Omaha, NE
BHM Birmingham International, Birmingham, AL ONT Ontario International, Ontario, CA
BNA Nashville International, Nashville, TN ORF Norfolk International, Norfolk/Virginia Beach, VA
BOI Boise, Boise, ID PBI Palm Beach International, West Palm Beach, FL
BUF Buffalo Niagara International, Buffalo, NY PDX Portland International, Portland, OR
BUR Bob Hope, Burbank, CA PHL Philadelphia International, Philadelphia, PA
BWI Baltimore/Washington International, Baltimore, MD PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International, Phoenix, AZ
CLE Cleveland Hopkins International, Cleveland, OH PIT Pittsburgh International, Pittsburgh, PA
CMH Port Columbus International, Columbus, OH PVD T. F. Green International, Providence, RI
DEN Denver International, Denver, CO RDU Raleigh-Durham International, Raleigh/Durham, NC
DTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County, Detroit, MI RNO Reno/Tahoe International, Reno, NV
ELP El Paso International, El Paso, TX RSW Southwest Florida International, Ft. Myers, FL
FLL Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International, Ft. Lauderdale, FL SAN San Diego International, San Diego, CA
GEG Spokane International, Spokane, WA SAT San Antonio International, San Antonio, TX
HOU William P. Hobby, Houston, TX SDF Louisville International, Louisville, KY
IAD Washington Dulles International, Washington, DC SEA Seattle-Tacoma International, Seattle, WA
IND Indianapolis International, Indianapolis, IN SFO San Francisco International, San Francisco, CA
JAN Jackson International, Jackson, MS SJC Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International, San Jose, CA
JAX Jacksonville International, Jacksonville, FL SLC Salt Lake City International, Salt Lake City, UT
LAS McCarran International, Las Vegas, NV SMF Sacramento International, Sacramento, CA
LAX Los Angeles International, Los Angeles, CA SNA John Wayne, Orange County, CA
LIT Adams Field, Little Rock, AR STL Lambert-St. Louis International, St. Louis, MO
MCI Kansas City International, Kansas City, MO TPA Tampa International, Tampa, FL
MCO Orlando International, Orlando, FL TUL Tulsa International, Tulsa, OK
MDW Midway International, Chicago, IL TUS Tucson International, Tucson, AZ
MHT Manchester-Boston Regional, Manchester, NH
To examine the impact of charging for one checked bag, we selected the flights
in the 35-day period preceding and the 35-day period following the implementation
of one checked bag fee by the specific airline. A 35-day window guarantees four
occurrences of the same day of a week, and is large enough to provide an adequate
sample size but small enough to isolate the impact of the baggage fee policies. Table
2.2 shows the dates when the airlines implemented their fees for one checked bag. For
instance, Continental, as one of the first airlines that started charging for one checked
bag, had its March 31 - June 8, 2008 flights included; AirTran, as the last among our
airlines to charge for one checked bag, had its April 10 - June 18, 2008 flights included.
However, Southwest, as the airline that did not charge for a checked bag (unless more
than two checked bags or overweight), had March 31 - June 18, 2008 flights included.
Using similar criteria as Deshpande and Arıkan [2012] and Arıkan, Deshpande, and
Sohoni [2012], we eliminated some bad records, and the final number of observations
in this first dataset after excluding cancelled flights was 513,907 flights.
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Table 2.2 Dates of implementing fee policies on one checked bag and two checked
bags
Airline Date of implementing the fee policy on Date of implementing the fee policy on
one checked bag two checked bags
Continental Airlines May 5th, 2008 October 7th, 2008
Delta Air Lines May 5th, 2008 December 5th, 2008
Northwest Airlines May 5th, 2008 August 28th, 2008
United Airlines May 5th, 2008 June 13th, 2008
US Airways May 5th, 2008 July 9th, 2008
American Airlines May 12th, 2008 June 15th, 2008
AirTran Airways May 15th, 2008 December 5th, 2008
To study the impact of two checked bags fees, we selected the flights of all the
airlines in our study in the March 31, 2008 - January 8, 2009 period. According to
Table 2.2, the boundaries of this period are given by the lower bound of the 35-day
period preceding the earliest implementation of one checked bag fee policy, and the
upper bound of the 35-day period following the last implementation of the two checked
bags fees policy. After eliminating bad records similar to the first dataset, the final
number of observations in this second dataset after excluding cancelled flights was
1,866,208 flights.
For our flight-level datasets, we used data from several sources such as the
BTS9, the FAA10, and the NCDC11 websites. Since most airports are weather
reporting stations, for each origin and destination airports we collected data on
daily precipitation level and average daily wind speed from the NCDC. Additional
variables were computed as well (see Table 2.3). All the variables in our datasets are
described next.
9http://www.transtats.bts.gov/databases.asp?Mode_ID=1&MODE_Desc=
Aviation&Subject_ID2=0 (last accessed September 22, 2012).
10http://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/aircraft_certification/aircraft_
registry/releaseable_aircraft_download/(last accessed September 22, 2012).
11http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/search(last accessed September 22, 2012).
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Table 2.3 Description of variables
Variable Description
Bag-Feei {0,1,2} variable indicating whether: a) no checked bag fee policy; or b) one checked
bag fee policy; or c) two checked bags fees policy was implemented on the flight i
date.
SpAdj-Departure-Delayi Difference between the actual departure time and the scheduled departure time
of flight i, adjusted for the spillover from the previous flight in an aircraft rotation.
Scheduled-Block-Timei Difference between the scheduled arrival time and the scheduled departure time of
flight i.
Actual-TurnAround-Timei Turn-around duration between the actual departure time of flight i and the actual
arrival time of the previous flight in an aircraft rotation (not applicable to the first
flight in an aircraft rotation).
Routei Origin-destination airports pair of flight i.
Origini Origin airport of flight i.
Carrieri Airline that flew flight i.
Monthi Month of flight i.
Day-of -Weeki Day of week of flight i.
Dep-Time-Blocki One-hour time block based on the scheduled departure time (e.g., 6:00am-6:59am)
of flight i.
Arr-Time-Blocki One-hour time block based on the scheduled arrival time of flight i.
Dep-Congestioni Number of flights scheduled to depart between 45 minutes before and 15 minutes
after the scheduled departure time of flight i.
Arr-Congestioni Number of flights scheduled to arrive between 45 minutes before and 15 minutes
after the scheduled arrival time of flight i.
Aircraft-Agei Age of the aircraft that flew flight i.
Avg-Passengersi Expected number of passengers on the aircraft that flew flight i.
Origin-Prcpi Precipitation level at the origin airport on the day of flight i (tenths of mm).
Dest-Prcpi Precipitation level at the destination airport on the day of flight i (tenths of mm).
Origin-Awndi Average wind speed at the origin airport on the day of flight i (tenths of meters
per second).
Dest-Awndi Average wind speed at the destination airport on the day of flight i (tenths of meters)
per second).
2.4.1.1 Explanatory Variable
Checked bag fee. The Bag-Fee ordinal variable indicates the status of each flight in
our datasets with regard to the checked bag fee policy of the airline that flew the flight.
Thus, Bag-Fee=1 indicates a flight with the one checked bag fee policy implemented
by the specific airline on that specific date, whereas Bag-Fee=0 indicates the absence
of such policy, i.e. no checked bag fee policy is implemented by the airline. Further,
Bag-Fee=2 indicates a flight with the first two checked bags fees policy implemented
by the airline on that specific date. Thus, the variable Bag-Fee has three levels, and
we estimate two coefficients (for Bag-Fee=1 and Bag-Fee=2 ) in our regression.
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2.4.1.2 Dependent Variables
Scheduled block time. For each flight i in our datasets, we computed the
Scheduled-Block-Time (Qi) as the difference between the scheduled arrival time and
its scheduled departure time, as shown in the carrier’s Computerized Reservations
System (CRS).
Spillover-adjusted departure delay. According to BTS, the departure
performance is based on departure from the gate. The departure delay is given by
the difference between the actual departure time and CRS departure time. In case
the actual departure occurs prior to the scheduled departure, the departure delay
becomes zero as a negative departure delay does not represent a “true” delay. Also,
a delay on one flight can potentially spill-over, or propagate, to the next flight since
any given aircraft for an airline typically flies multiple flights over the course of a
day. Therefore, our main dependent variable is spillover-adjusted departure delay
(SpAdj-Departure-Delay), which we computed for each flight i in our datasets by
subtracting any late aircraft delay from the previous flight i − 1 in the aircraft’s
rotation, from the departure delay of flight i. This eliminates the serial correlation
between observations in our dataset induced by consecutive flights using a common
aircraft routing.
To calculate the spillover, we follow Arıkan, Deshpande, and Sohoni [2012]’s
approach. Thus, we consider the sequence of flights operated by a particular tail
number as an aircraft rotation. More specifically, an aircraft’s rotation begins with
the first revenue flight after a major maintenance, or a layover of more than five hours
at an airport, and ends with the last flight operated before the aircraft returns for
its next maintenance or remains on the ground for several hours.12 Further, we refer
to the actual block time of a flight as DLi , and compute it as the difference between
12As crew schedule information is not publicly available, we assume that airline crews remain
with the aircraft.
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the actual arrival time of the flight and its scheduled departure time. Unlike the
traditional definition of actual block time, i.e. the difference between the actual arrival
time of the flight and its actual departure time, our definition captures the impact of
flight delays propagated through the system and departure delays associated with the
observed flight. The actual block time is comprised of several components including
taxi-out time, en route time, and taxi-in time, each one being subject to different
causes of delay, and thus the total block time delay is the sum of all individual
component delays.
The time duration between the next flight’s scheduled departure time, on an
aircraft rotation, and the earlier flight’s scheduled arrival time is referred to as the
scheduled ground time (Gi). In order to compute Gi, from the Airline On-time
Performance dataset, we first sorted the data by airline, tail number and scheduled
departure time so that all aircraft rotations are grouped together. Then, for each
flight i, we computed Gi by subtracting the scheduled arrival time of flight i−1 from
the scheduled departure time of flight i. A snapshot of one such aircraft rotation
flown by Southwest Airlines’ aircraft with tail number N208WN is shown in Table 2.4.
We computed the minimum time to turn an aircraft (Ti) by analyzing ground
times at different airports for different types of aircraft for each airline. First, we
grouped the actual ground-times for each flight flown in 2008 by airline, aircraft
model, and departure airport. We then computed the 5th percentile value (in
minutes) across all actual ground-times for each airline, aircraft model, and departure
airport combination. Additionally, we calculated the 5th percentile value (in minutes)
of actual ground-times for each airline-aircraft model and airline-departure airport
combinations. The minimum turn-around time for the corresponding flight i was
assumed to be this 5th percentile. Further, the buffer time available on ground for
flight i, Bi, is calculated by subtracting Ti from Gi for all flights except the first
flight on the rotation. The Bi value of the first flight of any rotation is assumed to
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Table 2.4 A snapshot of aircraft rotation: Southwest Airlines’ aircraft with tail
number N208WN
Position Route CRS Actual CRS Actual
Departure Time Departure Time Arrival Time Arrival Time
1 MHT–MDW 7:10 AM 7:12 AM 8:35 AM 8:55 AM
2 MDW–HOU 9:05 AM 9:27 AM 11:35 AM 11:55 AM
3 HOU–LAS 12:05 PM 12:27 PM 1:10 PM 1:32 PM
4 LAS–RNO 1:40 PM 2:00 PM 3:00 PM 3:09 PM
5 RNO–LAS 3:30 PM 3:42 PM 4:45 PM 4:56 PM
6 LAS–BUF 5:15 PM 5:31 PM 12:40 AM 12:45 AM
Scheduled Actual Scheduled Ground Minimum Turn- Buffer Time Spillover
Block Time (Qi) Block Time (DLi ) Time (Gi) Around Time (Ti) (Bi) (Li)
145 min 165 min - - - -
150 min 170 min 30 min 25 min 5 min 15 min
185 min 207 min 30 min 20 min 10 min 10 min
80 min 89 min 30 min 22 min 8 min 14 min
75 min 86 min 30 min 18 min 12 min 0 min
265 min 270 min 30 min 22 min 8 min 3 min
be zero. Thus, the spillover, Li, from flight i− 1 to flight i is given by
Li = [DLi−1 − (Qi−1 +Bi)]+.
Therefore, we computed the spillover-adjusted departure delay of a given flight
by subtracting the spillover from the previous flight in the aircraft’s rotation, from
the departure delay:
SpAdj-Departure-Delayi = (Actual Departure Timei − CRS Departure Timei)+ − Li.
Actual turn-around time. The time duration between the next flight’s actual
departure time, on an aircraft rotation, and the earlier flight’s actual arrival time is
referred to as Actual-TurnAround-Time.
2.4.1.3 Controls
Typical factors that influence departure delays are seasonal (e.g. passenger load
factor, weather, etc.), daily propagation related (e.g. late arriving crew, late arriving
aircraft, connecting passengers from late incoming flights, air traffic congestion), and
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random (e.g. mechanical problems, baggage problems, security delays) [Tu, Ball, and
Jank, 2008]. Since June 2003, the airlines that report on-time data to the BTS also
report the causes of delays13 for their flights. Figure 2.1 shows, for example, the
flight delays by cause in the year 2008, across all U.S. airports. The weather shows
up as the main source of delays, followed by air carrier delay (e.g. maintenance or
crew problems, aircraft cleaning, baggage loading, fueling, etc.), aircraft arriving late,
National Aviation System (e.g. airport operations, heavy traffic volume, air traffic
control, etc.), and lastly, security delay. However, a shortcoming of the Airline On-
Time Performance data is that the source of delay cannot distinguish between origin
and destination airports. By using individual flight level congestion and weather
related control variables at the origin and destination airports, and spillover-adjusted
departure delay as dependent variable, we do control for the main drivers of flight
delays. Hence, our conclusions related to baggage fees and departure delays are
robust, given that we used the following control variables:
Route. The Route variable captures all the fixed effects of an origin-destination pair
for each flight.
Origin. The Origin variable controls for unobserved origin airport specific effects
such as maintenance facilities, airport capacity, etc. that can potentially affect flight
departure.
Carrier. The Carrier variable denotes the airline that flew the flight, and controls
for airline specific effects.
Congestion at the origin/destination airport. Unlike prior literature which
used an average congestion measure, we computed two congestion measures for each
individual flight, i.e.: 1) departure congestion, Dep-Congestion, as the number of
13The causes of delays are reported in the following broad categories: air carrier, extreme weather,
National Aviation System (NAS), late-arriving aircraft, and security. To obtain total weather-
related delays, we combined the extreme weather delays and the NAS weather category, with the
weather-related delays included in the “late-arriving aircraft” category (calculated as per the BTS
methodology).
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Figure 2.1 Flight delays by cause in January-December, 2008 (based on the
BTS data on all carriers and airports)
flights scheduled to depart in an adjacent time block (i.e. between 45 minutes
before and 15 minutes after the scheduled departure time of that flight) from the
origin airport, that can potentially delay the flight, and 2) arrival congestion, Arr-
Congestion, as the number of flights scheduled to arrive in an adjacent time block
(between 45 minutes before and 15 minutes after the scheduled arrival of that flight)
at the destination airport.
Month. The Month variable denotes the month of the flight which controls for the
seasonal demand fluctuations.
Day of the week. The Day-of-Week variable indicates the day of the week of the
flight, controlling thus for lighter versus heavier travel days.
Departure/arrival time block. Because delays are generally expected to worsen
over the course of a day, we use Dep-Time-Block/Arr-Time-Block variables to control
for the one-hour time block of the scheduled departure/arrival time (e.g., 6:00am-
6:59am) of the flight.
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Age of aircraft. As the tail number is an unique identifier for each aircraft, we used
it to collect the aircraft’s year of manufacturing from the Aircraft Registry Database
hosted by FAA. Hence, we were able to compute the age of the aircraft as of the year
of the flight.
Average number of passengers. The uniqueness of the tail number also offers
information on the number of seats of each aircraft, as per the Aircraft Registry
Database. We multiplied this seating capacity by the load factor we collected from
BTS’ T -100 Domestic Segment (U.S. Carriers). As the load factor is the monthly
proportion of total seats that were actually filled for an airline on a specific route, we
were able to compute the average number of passengers on each flight, thus controlling
for the demand for air travel.
Weather related variables. Adverse weather conditions increase the likelihood of
making adaptation decisions. Thus, the precipitation level (tenths of mm) on the
day of the flight at the origin and destination airports are captured by Origin-Prcp
and Dest-Prcp variables. Similarly, the average wind speed (tenth of meters per
second) on the day of the flight at the origin and destination airports are captured
by Origin-Awnd and Dest-Awnd variables.
A summary of descriptive statistics of the continuous variables used in our analysis
is presented in Table 2.5.
2.4.2 Models
Previous studies have investigated the impact of various factors on departure delay
by examining OLS and instrumental variables estimates. However, to evaluate the
impact of charging for checked bags on departure delay, we employ the censored
regression model Tobit, given the following:
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Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics
Variable First dataset Second dataset
N Mean SD N Mean SD
SpAdj-Departure-Delay 513,907 6.0995 22.8233 1,866,208 6.2358 23.6840
Scheduled-Block-Time 512,928 138.3611 71.9553 1,861,809 140.2325 72.5715
Actual-TurnAround-Time 365,087 47.4051 30.5309 1,316,591 49.3889 31.5419
Dep-Congestion 513,907 19.6835 14.3445 1,866,208 19.2749 14.3013
Arr-Congestion 513,907 24.3167 21.0789 1,866,208 24.5563 21.5455
Aircraft-Age 492,170 10.2811 8.5675 1,781,660 11.2789 8.0856
Avg-Passengers 492,233 107.9543 29.9775 1,791,887 105.9316 31.9048
Origin-Prcp 510,868 18.5503 67.9132 1,863,071 19.4913 72.9711
Dest-Prcp 511,290 20.6380 69.7319 1,863,394 21.4509 78.0365
Origin-Awnd 488,641 39.5498 16.6166 1,830,698 34.0933 16.0301
Dest-Awnd 491,503 41.2326 17.5546 1,834,650 35.9083 16.8022
Let yi represent the time when a flight i is ready for take-off and let
CRSdeparturei represent the scheduled departure time shown in the carrier’s CRS.
Then, departure delay is:
DepartureDelayi = (yi − CRSdeparturei)+.
However, yi is a latent variable and DepartureDelayi is the observed variable.
Hence, a Tobit regression model is appropriate here. Moreover, standard regression
techniques (OLS) provide inconsistent parameter estimates when applied to a large
number of observations in the sample equal to the lower bound for the dependent
variable [Greene, 2008]. In the Tobit model, which uses the maximum likelihood
estimation, the statistical significance of individual parameter estimates is evaluated
by Wald Chi-square tests which replace the t-tests in OLS14
The estimation model of the impact of the checked bag fees on the spillover-
adjusted departure delay is shown in Eq.2.1. We use the first dataset to differentiate
between the effects of charging for one checked bag (Bag-Fee=1), respectively not
charging for a checked bag (Bag-Fee=0), and label this model Tobit1. In addition,
to concurrently disentangle the effects of charging for the first two checked bags
14All the analyses are conducted using SAS 9.3.
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(Bag-Fee=2), only charging for one checked bag (Bag-Fee=1), and not charging for
a checked bag (Bag-Fee=0), we use the second dataset and label the model Tobit2.
SpAdj-Departure-Delayi = β0 + β1 ∗ (Bag-Feei = 1) + β2 ∗ (Bag-Feei = 2) +
β3 ∗ Routei + β4 ∗Origini + β5 ∗ Carrieri +
β6 ∗Monthi + β7 ∗ Day-of-Weeki +
β8 ∗ Dep-Time-Blocki + β9 ∗ Arr-Time-Blocki +
β10 ∗ Dep-Congestioni + β11 ∗ Arr-Congestioni +
β12 ∗ Aircraft-Agei + β13 ∗ Avg-Passengersi +
β14 ∗Origin-Prcpi + β15 ∗ Dest-Prcpi +
β16 ∗Origin-Awndi + β17 ∗ Dest-Awndi + εi. (2.1)
To analyze the impact of Bag-Fee on Scheduled-Block-Time, we use the second
dataset to test the model in Eq.2.2, an OLS regression model (labeled OLS1) as
Scheduled-Block-Time is not affected by censoring. Given that the scheduled block
time is typically determined several months in advance based on the estimates of the
time it takes to complete each flight [Deshpande and Arıkan, 2012], the model does
not include weather related variables.
Scheduled-Block-Timei = β0 + β1 ∗ (Bag-Fee = 1) + β2 ∗ (Bag-Fee = 2) +
β3 ∗ Routei + β4 ∗Origini + β5 ∗ Carrieri +
β6 ∗Monthi + β7 ∗ Day-of-Weeki +
β8 ∗ Dep-Time-Blocki + β9 ∗ Arr-Time-Blocki +
β10 ∗ Dep-Congestioni + β11 ∗ Arr-Congestioni +
β12 ∗ Aircraft-Agei + β13 ∗ Avg-Passengersi + εi. (2.2)
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2.5 Results and Discussion
2.5.1 Spillover-Adjusted Departure Delay
The results of the estimation of our Tobit1 model are shown in Table 2.615. The
coefficient for the Bag-Fee indicator variable which indicates one checked bag fee
as being implemented, is negative and statistically significant (-1.8701; p<0.0001).
This indicates that when the flights encounter departure delays, the implementation
of one checked bag fees reduces SpAdj-Departure-Delay by 1.8701 minutes versus no
implementation of these fees. In other words, the airlines that implemented the fee
for one checked bag saw their departure performance improve, whereas Southwest
Airlines experienced a negative impact on its departure performance. We thus find
support for Hypothesis 1A, and consequently reject Hypothesis 1B. The coefficients
for the categorical variables for Origin, Route, Carrier, Month, Day-of-Week, Dep-
Time-Block, and Arr-Time-Block are not reported to conserve space, although they
are statistically significant. Table 2.6 also shows that the other control variables,
except Avg-Passengers, are statistically significant.
Our study suggests that in the 35-day period following the date of implementing
fees for one checked bag, the airlines that did implement these fees experienced
improved relative performance in terms of their departure delays. We expect that
the price-insensitive passengers or those passengers traveling with only one checked
bag were indifferent to this policy change. The same policy may have caused a
change in other passengers’ behavior in the sense that fewer passengers may have
checked a second bag while still flying their preferred airline. Another possible
explanation is that price-sensitive customers of those airlines that charged for one
checked bag started flying Southwest instead. While it is obvious that additional
passengers generate additional revenues for an airline, it is less obvious that more
15The results were robust when controlling for Scheduled-Block-Time variable as well.
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Table 2.6 Summary of Tobit1 regression
Dependent variable: SpAdj-Departure-Delay
Variable d.f. Level Parameter estimate
Intercept -23.5479***
(5.6745)



























Number of observations used 448,659
Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses.
The number of observations used is different from the first dataset sample size
due to missing values of Aircraft-Age, Avg-Passengers, Origin-Prcp, Dest-Prcp,
Origin-Awnd, and Dest-Awnd variables.
***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
passengers represent an increased likelihood of departure delays. One indication of
this relationship comes from AirTran Airways’ Senior VP who openly declared that
it is sometimes better to delay a flight to wait for passengers or baggage [McCartney,
2010b]. Thus, the more passengers, the higher the probability of a delayed pushback.
Table 2.7 lists the Tobit2 estimation results16. The coefficient for the Bag-Fee
variable which indicates the one checked bag fee as being implemented, is negative
and marginally significant (-0.4443; p<0.1), whereas the coefficient for the Bag-
16The results were robust when controlling for Scheduled-Block-Time variable as well.
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Fee variable corresponding to implementing two checked bag fees, is positive and
statistically significant (0.6229; p<0.05).
Table 2.7 Summary of Tobit2 regression
Dependent variable: SpAdj-Departure-Delay
Variable d.f. Level Parameter estimate
Intercept -21.8447***
(3.2547)





























Number of observations used 1,718,598
Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses.
The number of observations used is different from the second dataset sample size
due to missing values of Aircraft-Age, Avg-Passengers, Origin-Prcp, Dest-Prcp,
Origin-Awnd, and Dest-Awnd variables.
***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
That is, when the flights encounter departure delays, the implementation of
two checked bag fees has triggered an additional increase in SpAdj-Departure-Delay
relative to the implementation of only one checked bag fees of 1.0672 minutes. We
reject Hypothesis 2A as we find support for Hypothesis 2B. Similar to Table 2.6, the
coefficients for the categorical variables for Origin, Route, Carrier, Month, Day-of-
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Week, Dep-Time-Block, and Arr-Time-Block are not shown in the interest of space,
although they are statistically significant. As seen in Table 2.7, the other control
variables are also statistically significant.
Thus, when examining departure delays over a longer period of time covering the
time periods around the implementation dates of one checked bag and two checked
bags fees policies, the fee for one checked bag showed the same impact as previously
described. Moreover, the implementation of two checked bags fees policy indicated
worse departure performance relative to the implementation of only one checked bag
fee, as well as relative to not charging for checked bags. Our finding can be explained
by the fact that the passengers that had previously traveled with only one checked
bag may have changed their behavior and began carrying on their baggage instead,
increasing the likelihood of a delayed departure.
Because JetBlue Airways started charging their passengers for one checked bag on
June 1st 2008, we did not include its flights in our first dataset. Its inclusion would
have prevented us from identifying the effect of one checked bag fees implemented
by the other airlines, as its ‘after’ 35-day time window overlaps with the period of
charging for the first two checked bags by American Airlines, US Airways, and United
Airlines. Yet, when including JetBlue Airways’ flights in the second dataset (i.e.
March 31, 2008 - January 8, 2009), the Tobit results in Table 2.817 show positive and
statistically significant coefficients of Bag-Fee variable for both one checked bag fee
(0.5453; p<0.05) and two checked bags fees (1.3410; p<0.0001) policies.
To better understand the change of sign for the coefficient for the one checked
bag fee variable18, we created two datasets, i.e. ‘Legacy Carriers’ dataset comprising
American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United
17The results were robust when controlling for Scheduled-Block-Time variable as well.
18We did not include interaction terms between the Bag-Fee indicator variables and Carrier
dummy variable since they are complicated to interpret in nonlinear models such as Tobit [Ai and
Norton, 2003].
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Table 2.8 Summary of Tobit2 regression - JetBlue Airways included
Dependent variable: SpAdj-Departure-Delay
Variable d.f. Level Parameter estimate
Intercept -21.5563***
(3.3168)





























Number of observations used 1,779,002
Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses.
The number of observations used is different from the dataset sample size
due to missing values of Aircraft-Age, Avg-Passengers, Origin-Prcp, Dest-Prcp,
Origin-Awnd, and Dest-Awnd variables.
***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
Airlines, US Airways, and Southwest Airlines, and ‘Low-Cost Carriers’ dataset
comprising AirTran Airways, JetBlue Airways, and Southwest Airlines19. The Tobit
results in Table 2.920 show positive and statistically significant coefficients of Bag-Fee
variable for both one checked bag fee and two checked bags fees policies, for Low-Cost
19As Southwest Airlines is used as control in our experiments (being the only major airline that
never charged a bag fee), we include it in both datasets.
20The results were robust when controlling for Scheduled-Block-Time variable as well.
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Table 2.9 Summary of Tobit2 regression: Legacy Carriers vs. Low-Cost
Carriers
Dependent variable: SpAdj-Departure-Delay
Legacy Carriers Low-Cost Carriers




Bag-Fee 2 0 - 2 0 -
1 -1.8724*** 1 6.3123***
(0.2598) (0.3095)









Dep-Congestion 1 0.1991*** 1 0.1468***
(0.0060) (0.0067)
Arr-Congestion 1 0.1224*** 1 0.1256***
(0.0051) (0.0062)
Aircraft-Age 1 0.0867*** 1 0.1723***
(0.0065) (0.0072)
Avg-Passengers 1 0.0443*** 1 0.1078***
(0.0019) (0.0036)
Origin-Prcp 1 0.0331*** 1 0.0276***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Dest-Prcp 1 0.0384*** 1 0.0293***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Origin-Awnd 1 0.0723*** 1 0.048***
(0.0029) (0.0030)
Dest-Awnd 1 0.0543*** 1 0.0276***
(0.0028) (0.0029)
Log Likelihood -3,627,536 -1,945,625
Number of observations used 1,642,925 816,985
Note. The Legacy Carriers include American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest
Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, and Southwest Airlines.
The Low-Cost Carriers include AirTran Airways, JetBlue Airways, and Southwest Airlines.
Standard errors are shown in parantheses.
***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
Carriers. Thus, it appears that JetBlue and AirTran Airways passengers were more
likely to carry their previously checked bags on board. This in turn increases the
likelihood of a delayed departure, especially considering the loose enforcement of
carry-on rules leading to traffic jams while boarding.
While citing Boeing’s discovery that boarding times had doubled over the last two
decades, Mouawad [2011] has recently argued that “[c]hecked-baggage fees have only
added to the problem, because travelers now take more roll-ons onboard, blocking the
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isles as they try to cram their belongings into any available space”. Moreover, this
practice increases the likelihood of lack of overhead space, which in turn leads to “bags
that need to be checked at the last minute - a common cause of delayed flights”. On
the other hand, Table 2.9 shows negative coefficients of the same variable, and thus
indicates that American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest
Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways passengers were less price sensitive and did
not change their behavior to carry on more bags as the low-cost carriers customers
appear to have.
2.5.2 Scheduled Block Time
The results of the OLS1 regression estimates for each airline’s scheduled block
times are shown in Table 2.10. The coefficient of Bag-Fee corresponding to one
checked bag fee is not significant, whereas the coefficient of Bag-Fee corresponding
to the first two checked bags fees is negative and statistically significant (-0.3796;
p<0.0001), providing partial support for Hypothesis H3B. These results indicate that
any anticipated change in departure performance due to one checked bag fee policy
was not originally captured in airlines’ scheduled block times. The airlines were not
able to capture it as they typically schedule the block times about six months in
advance [Deshpande and Arıkan, 2012]. On February 4th, 2008 United Airlines was
the first airline announcing its plan to implement the fee for the second piece of
baggage in three months, namely starting May 5th, whereas the other airlines were
still contemplating a similar move21.
21“American declined to comment on United’s move. So did Delta Air Lines Inc., citing a policy
of not discussing future fee changes. US Airways Group Inc., and Northwest Airlines Corp. said
they are studying it. Discount king Southwest Airlines Co. last month started charging $25 for a
third checked bag in place of letting customers bring three bags free of charge. But a spokesman
said Southwest doesn’t anticipate charging for the first two pieces, if they aren’t overweight.”[Carey,
2008]
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Table 2.10 Summary of OLS1 regression
Dependent variable: Scheduled-Block-Time
Variable d.f. Level Parameter estimate
Intercept 56.3201***
(0.3259)





















Number of observations used 1,839,718
Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses.
The number of observations used is different from the second dataset sample size
due to missing values of Aircraft-Age and Avg-Passengers variables.
***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
It is well known that airlines pad their scheduled block times so that even late
flights technically arrive on time and boost the “on-time” performance records
released to the public. However, this action can frustrate passengers who have to wait
on board since the planes often arrive well before gates are available. As American
Airlines’ VP of Operations Planning and Performance simply put it, “[e]ven if you
arrive on time, the goodwill is blown, and people think we are idiots” [McCartney,
2012b]. Referring to the padded approach, US Airways’ COO also recognized: “You
can do all sort of things to make up for poor performance. But you sacrifice efficiency,
the passenger experience, the employee experience and profits” [McCartney, 2012b].
Our results indicate that the airlines anticipated an improvement in their departure
performance due to the checked bag fees policies. Given that inflated scheduled block
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times irritate passengers and are costly, the results indicate that airlines decreased
the scheduled block times and, given the longer time span over which the first two
checked bags fees policy was implemented, the effect is captured in our results. We
thus have an indication that the operations managers of these airlines may have
acted proactively to the marketing decision to impose fees for checked bags, but
they did so in the wrong direction as their departure delay performance actually
decreased.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by other factors within the
airline’s control, we used the second dataset to analyze the impact of Bag-Fee on
Actual-TurnAround-Time, which is the time duration between the next flight’s actual
departure time and the preceding flight’s actual arrival time on an aircraft rotation.
We employ an OLS regression model (labeled OLS2), as follows:
Actual-TurnAround-Timei = β0 + β1 ∗ (Bag-Fee = 1) + β2 ∗ (Bag-Fee = 2) +
β3 ∗ Routei + β4 ∗Origini + β5 ∗ Carrieri +
β6 ∗Monthi + β7 ∗ Day-of-Weeki +
β8 ∗ Dep-Time-Blocki + β9 ∗ Arr-Time-Blocki +
β10 ∗ Dep-Congestioni + β11 ∗ Aircraft-Agei +
β12 ∗ Avg-Passengersi + β13 ∗Origin-Awndi +
β14 ∗Origin-Prcpi + εi. (2.3)
Table 2.11 shows the results according to Eq.2.3. The coefficient for the Bag-Fee
variable corresponding to charging only for one checked bag, is negative (-0.1326) but
not statistically significant. The coefficient for the Bag-Fee variable corresponding to
the implementation of first two checked bag fees is positive and statistically significant
(0.9624; p<0.0001), indicating that the two checked bags fees policy brings about
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Table 2.11 Summary of OLS2 regression
Dependent variable: Actual-TurnAround-Time
Variable d.f. Level Parameter estimate
Intercept 42.5939***
(1.5736)























Number of observations used 1,285,420
Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses.
The number of observations used is different from the second dataset sample size due
to missing values of Actual-TurnAround-Time, Aircraft-Age and Avg-Passengers variables.
***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
an additional increase in Actual-TurnAround-Time relative to charging only for one
checked bag of 1.095 minutes. This incremental effect is also consistent with the
incremental effect caused by the two checked bags fees policy on SpAdj-Departure-
Delay. Because our model includes a rich set of control variables, we are able to
explain about 38% of the variation in Actual-TurnAround-Time variable.
As another robustness check, we conducted a paired t-test by comparing the
delay differences experienced by the airlines that implemented the one checked bag
fee against the delay differences encountered by Southwest Airlines within the same
time windows at the corresponding airports. For each airport-airline combination, we
calculated the departure delay averages in the 30-day period preceding (the Before
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period) and the 30-day period following (the After period) the implementation of the
one checked bag fee policy by the specific airline. Thus, for each airport, we calculated
the average difference in the departure delays, i.e. average delay in the After period
minus average delay in the Before period. Further, for comparison purposes we paired
the departure delay difference experienced by an airline at a particular airport with
the departure delay difference experienced by Southwest at the same airport. We
computed relative weighted averages for non-Southwest airlines group and Southwest,
by deriving the relative market shares from the absolute market shares of airlines
within each airport as calculated by the number of flights completed. To examine
whether there is a difference in departure delays across the two groups, we performed
a paired t-test, whose difference of -3.68 minutes was statistically significant with a
p-value< 0.05. Thus, Southwest Airlines experienced a greater difference in departure
delays between the After and Before periods than the other airlines, at the 57 airports.
That is, the airline that did not implement one checked bag fees encountered a greater
relative average departure delay than the airlines that imposed fees on one checked
bag. We did not conduct a similar test for the first two checked bags fees, as the
airlines started charging these fees over a longer time horizon (see Table 2.2), which
makes it difficult to isolate an unique effect of this policy using this technique. Nor
did we include JetBlue in this test, for the same reasons we did not include it in the
Tobit1 regression. However, this test adds support to our Tobit1 regression results.
2.6 Conclusions
While investigating whether the social planner would let bags fly free, Allon,
Bassamboo, and Lariviere [2011] argue that “baggage fees are not just about revenue.
They serve to alter consumer behavior in a manner that is beneficial to both the
firm and customers. The firm enjoys lower costs and passes some of these savings
on to customers”. Our study provides empirical evidence that the checked baggage
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fee policies did alter passengers’ behavior, yet in a different way than previously
postulated. While the reduction in the number of checked bags may indeed have
resulted in savings due to lower labor costs for handling checked bags, our findings
suggest that the resulting increase in the quantity of bags carried-on may have had a
detrimental effect on the airline’s costs through a decrease in their on-time departure
performance. As is the case with many incentives and penalties, finding the right
amount for each that results in a positive change in customers’ behavior is a complex
task. Our findings highlight factors, such as the effect of carry-on bags, that need to
be incorporated in designing incentive schemes.
Our research also sheds some light on the decisions made by a very operationally
focused airline. When the other airlines started charging for one checked bag,
Southwest Airlines’ decision to not charge for bags went against their high operational
service level strategy as their relative departure delay performance initially decreased.
When the other airlines began charging for the first two checked bags, however,
Southwest’s decision appears to be in line with their strategy. While bags may
not really “fly free” in an operational sense at Southwest, not charging passengers
for checking bags does seem to help avoid the worst carry-on abuses seen at other
airlines that have led to a degradation of on-time departure performance. This
degradation seems to be especially pronounced for low cost airlines. Southwest is
currently faced with this decision again as it has recently merged with AirTran
Airways, an airline that currently charges for checked bags. Thus, for a company like
Southwest Airlines, which has a long history of being one of the best in its industry
for operational performance and customer satisfaction, the decision of not charging
AirTran Airways’ passengers for the first two checked bags appears to be in line with
their operational strategy.
Ultimately, operations managers need to be involved in the discussions about
marketing initiatives such as this one to evaluate the operational impact of marketing
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initiatives. We have an indication that this occurred at some level as our results
support the argument that after initially observing little performance decline, the
airlines felt the need to shorten their scheduled block times. In hindsight, however,
this may not have been the right decision given the performance deterioration
observed after they began charging for the two checked bags.
Increased boarding times as a result of baggage fees have financial implications as
well. In 2005 Southwest estimated that, if its boarding times increased by 10 minutes
per flight, it would need 40 more planes at a cost of $40 million each to fly the same
number of flights [Lewis and Lieber, 2005]. When other airlines started charging for
one bag, our analysis shows an impact of increased departure delays of 1.87 minutes
per flight for Southwest, resulting in an estimated financial impact of approximately
$40 million per year 22. We speculate that Southwest now achieves savings of similar
magnitude after other airlines implemented the first two checked bags fee policy. As
Southwest completes its merger with AirTran Airways, they face a difficult decision
of whether to keep the baggage fee policy in place at AirTran or convert them to their
no baggage fee policy. Our research shows that this decision is more nuanced than it
may first appear. As of this writing, Southwest has decided to keep the baggage fee
policy at AirTran in place for the short term. Our research helps shed light on some
of the tradeoffs involved in this decision.
22This estimation is based on a delay cost of $19.49 per minute for Southwest Airlines
[Ferguson, Kara, Hoffman, and Sherry, 2012] which operates more than 3,000 flights a
day (http://swamedia.com/channels/Corporate-Fact-Sheet/pages/corporate-fact-sheet#
history last accessed March 7, 2013).
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Chapter 3
Airline Customer Preferences in the Baggage
Fees Era
3.1 Introduction
In the early 2008, record fuel prices were a source of severe financial pressure in the
U.S. airline industry. For competitive reasons, the airlines had not been able to raise
ticket prices enough to offset that increasing expense. Consequently, the airlines were
looking for ways to both increase revenues and reduce costs. Moving customers to
“a la carte” pricing has proved such a way, and bags checking has become a service
that was once complimentary. Since instituted in 2008 by most U.S. airlines, the
fees for checked bags have proven a steady revenue stream. As recently as 2012, the
baggage fees amounted to $3.5 billion, or 3.8% increase compared to 2011, when the
baggage fees generated approximately one-half of the industry’s profit of $7 billion
[BTS, 2013]. Given that in 2012 only 0.8% more total system passengers were carried
by U.S. airlines than in 2011 [BTS Press Release, March 2013], we can conclude the
growing acceptance of baggage fees by travelers, which in turn, has helped return the
industry to profitability.
The previous literature (e.g., Allon, Bassamboo, and Lariviere [2011]) has
postulated an additional purpose of the baggage fees, i.e. “to alter consumer
behavior in a manner that is beneficial to both the firm and customers”. That is,
one approach taken by airlines in order to lower their costs has been to discourage
travelers from checking bags by implementing checked baggage fees, which some
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have argued would also benefit travelers. Indeed, it has been documented that the
number of checked bags declined since the airlines imposed checked baggage fees [U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2010]. Thus, customers who check baggage enjoy
fewer opportunities for mishandled baggage. Yet, the recent 2013 North America
Airline Satisfaction Study by J.D. Power & Associates has revealed that “[b]aggage
fees continue (...) to lead to lower satisfaction levels” [J.D. Power & Associates Press
Release, May 2013] as they still represent a source of dissatisfaction for customers
who check bags.
While offering the service of checking bags adds additional costs to the airlines,
it remains to be shown what benefits this service provides, beyond the obvious
increase in revenues from the fees. In other words, airlines are interested in
determining whether they should change their operations policies and spend more or
less resources to make it easier or harder for customers to check bags. We seek to
provide guidance for this decision by explaining a potential new way of segmenting
travelers based on their sensitivities to itinerary attributes. More specifically, we
investigate whether travelers who check bags and travelers who do not check bags
have different sensitivities to the historical on-time performance, total travel time,
airfare, and number of connections when choosing an itinerary. Addressing this issue
is particularly important as most major airlines are evaluating operational changes
that may make the process of checking bags even less convenient than it currently is.
If these actions result in the loss of additional customers who prefer to check their
bags, then it is important to understand the relative value of this customer segment.
To empirically examine these issues, we use data from an Internet-based stated-
preference survey conducted by Resource Systems Group, Inc. in the Spring of 2012,
who surveyed 878 U.S. domestic travelers who had flown a domestic flight within
the last six months. We analyze this data using discrete choice modeling, to help
understand why a customer makes a particular choice and how the customer makes
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trade-offs among the characteristics of the choices [Garrow, 2010]. Our results confirm
previous studies that show the positive effect of on-time performance, and negative
effects of total travel time, airfare, and number of connections on the probability that
a traveler chooses a particular itinerary. In addition, we find evidence that travelers
who check bags appear to be more valuable customers than customers who do not
check bags are. Regarding the total travel time of an itinerary, we identify a less
negative impact on the itinerary utility for travelers who check bags versus travelers
who do not check bags. Next, we find the airfare as having a more negative impact
on the itinerary utility for travelers who do not check bags relative to travelers who
check bags and pay the associated baggage fees. Our results show a more negative
impact of the airfare on the itinerary utility for travelers who check bags but do
not pay the associated fees versus travelers who check bags and pay the associated
fees. Finally, we identify a less negative impact of the number of connections for
travelers who check bags versus those who do not check bags relative to those who
check bags. Thus, travelers who check bags appear to be less sensitive to total travel
time, airfare, and number of connections than those travelers who do not check bags.
These findings have important implications for airlines that are considering making
further cost savings in their baggage checking operations.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant
literature on air travel choice behavior, then the hypotheses tested in this study are
presented in Section 3. The description of the data used in the analysis is shown in
Section 4, along with the econometric framework of discrete choice models. Section 5




Earlier studies of air travel choice behavior examined a single-dimension choice or
only a few dimensions of choice such as origin and destination airports in regions
with multiple airports, airline, desired departure and arrival times, airfare, aircraft
type, access mode, etc. However, as travelers select a multi-dimension choice set,
researchers shifted their focus towards the choice between itineraries as defined by
multi-dimension choices. As such, a large body of research has been developed
based on the online stated-preference survey of U.S. domestic air travelers conducted
periodically by Resource Systems Group, Inc. since 2000, which has been supported
by various airlines and government agencies [Garrow, 2010].
Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006] use the 2001 survey to model demographic and
unobserved heterogeneity in business air travelers’ sensitivity to service attributes in
itinerary choice. They find that women, individuals traveling in a group, and high
income earners are less sensitive to airfares than men, individuals traveling alone, and
low income earners. They also find that frequent travelers and travelers who check
bags are more time-tolerant, less likely to be influenced by on-time performance, and
more patient to connections than occasional travelers and travelers who do not check
bags.
Using the 2003 survey, Adler, Falzarano, and Spitz [2005] model the effects of
airline, airport, aircraft type, airfare, access time, flight time, scheduled arrival time,
and on-time performance on itinerary choices. Their results indicate the importance
of factoring in traveler preference heterogeneity by using segmentation by trip purpose
(i.e. business vs. non-business). Also, the service attributes included in their
model have significant values to travelers, being impacted by the travelers’ frequent
flyer status. Although the on-time performance was not reported in a real-situation
itinerary in 2003, the survey identifies it as an important selection criterion for
travelers. Hess, Adler, and Polak [2007] further segment the same dataset into
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business, holiday, visiting friends and relatives (VFR) segments, and find for all of
these segments a negative sensitivity to access time, airfare, flight time, and the
number of connections, along with a positive sensitivity to improvements in on-time
performance and top-ranked airports. Hess, Adler, and Polak [2007] also identify a
higher sensitivity to airfare on longer flights for holiday and VFR segments, with no
such significant sensitivity to airfare in case of business travelers. Unlike business
and VFR travelers, holiday travelers were found to be more sensitive to on-time
performance on longer flights. Finally, the results show negative effects of late arrival
times for the case of business travelers, and early arrival times for the case of VFR
travelers.
Using the 2005 survey, Hess [2007] conducts a posterior analysis of random taste
coefficients in air travel behavior modeling, while Hess [2008] examines the treatment
of reference alternatives in stated choice surveys for air travel choice behavior. Both
studies show the expected impacts of all the attributes considered as affecting the
utility of an itinerary, i.e. access time, airfare, flight time, on-time performance,
number of connections, frequent flyer membership, and airport proximity. Further,
Theis, Adler, Clarke, and Ben-Akiva [2006] use the same dataset to investigate the risk
aversion to short connections in airline itinerary choice. Although these researchers
speculate that travelers might incur lower utilities from shorter connecting time versus
longer connecting time based on the potential discomfort of a rapid connection and
the associated misconnection risk, they do not find support for their premise.
Finally, Hess and Adler [2011] analyze trends in air travel behavior by using four
related stated-preference surveys (in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005) to examine how
much the basic choice processes that travelers use to select flight alternatives have
changed over this time period. They find changes in the type of air trips (fewer
short trips due to time-consuming security checks), ticket booking (more online flight
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searches and self-ticketing) and preferences among individual airlines and airports
(due to changed conditions and services).
Other researchers have also contributed to the air travel choice literature based on
stated-preference survey methodology. For instance, Proussaloglou and Koppelman
[1999] use a telephone survey to obtain stated preferences of travelers in the Chicago-
Denver and Dallas-Denver markets, for whom reported choices of actual trips have
been already collected. Their analysis shows negative effects of airfare, especially for
leisure travelers, and schedule delay, and positive effects of frequent flyer membership,
increased market presence of the carrier, and quality of service.
Using stated-preference data collected from international air travelers who have
flown Taipei-Tokyo and Taipei-Hong Kong routes, Wen and Lai [2010] confirm the
importance of service attributes such as airfare, schedule time difference, flight
frequency, on-time performance, check-in service, in-flight seat space, and cabin crew
service, when making airline choice. Similarly, based on stated-preference surveys
of travelers in a Portuguese air corridor, Pereira, Almeida, de Menezes, and Vieira
[2007] find the airfare, penalty for changes in the ticket, food, comfort, frequency, and
reliability (as punctuality warranties) have the expected effect on itinerary choice.
Collins, Rose, and Hess [2012] use both traditional and interactive stated-choice
surveys to elicit individuals’ responses on air travel behavior regarding return travel
from Sydney, Australia to either London or Paris. They find negative effects of the
airfare, carbon tax, charge of flight change, flight time, number of connections, and
arrival times. No aircraft effects have been retrieved, while positive effects have been
found for the frequent flyer memberships.
A stated-preference experiment to analyze individuals’ preferences for the main
attributes defining the service offered by the airlines on the most important route
connecting the Canary Islands archipelago with the Iberian Peninsula (i.e. Gran
Canaria - Madrid) was conducted and used by Espino, Martín, and Román [2008]
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and Martín, Román, and Espino [2008]. Their analyses show the expected negative
effects of airfare and penalty for changes in the ticket, and positive effects of free
food on board, comfort (as leg room), frequency, and reliability (as compensation in
case of delay). Also, Brey and Walker [2011] use an Internet-based stated preference
survey conducted by the Boeing Company in the Fall of 2004 targeted to individuals
searching for round trips within the continental U.S., and find negative effects of
airfare and flight time.
To conclude, the previously mentioned studies model air travel choices by relying
on stated preference experiments that compare customer choices between either a
revealed preference alternative against one or more stated preference alternatives, or
two or more stated preference alternatives. Our study, based on the Resource Systems
Group survey data, is most similar to Adler, Falzarano, and Spitz [2005], Warburg,
Bhat, and Adler [2006], Hess, Adler, and Polak [2007], and Hess and Adler [2011],
who consider attributes such as airfare, flight time, on-time performance, number of
connections, aircraft type, and carrier, that potentially affect itinerary choice.
Our study adds to the literature on air travel choice behavior by modeling airline
service trade-offs in air itinerary choices as recently as 2012. Recognizing that airlines
are facing domestic changes in their business environment and in customer behavior,
Teichert, Shehu, and von Wartburg [2008] assert that class flown and trip purpose
(i.e. business vs. leisure) have become obsolete, failing to accurately discriminate
heterogeneous customer segments. Adler, Falzarano, and Spitz [2005] emphasize the
importance of “explicitly accounting for traveler preference heterogeneities by using
segmentation, interaction effects, and random parameter specifications”. We take
these aspects into consideration when seeking a better understanding of the impact
the checked bags policies have had on customer choice. More specifically, we explore
whether the fact that customers check bags or not identifies customers into a distinct
segment, similar to how trip purpose has been explored in previous studies (see
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business vs. non-business in Adler, Falzarano, and Spitz [2005]; business, holiday and
VFR in Hess, Adler, and Polak [2007]).
Whether the travelers check bags or not is also among the trip related
characteristics considered by Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006]. However, their
analysis is based on the Spring 2001 survey of business travelers, when no U.S.
airlines were charging their passengers for the first two checked bags. The U.S.
domestic air industry has changed dramatically since the Spring of 2001. The range
of options available to air travelers has increased in many markets, and most airlines
implemented fee policies on the first two checked bags in 2008. As such, further
examination of the attributes valued by travelers is warranted four years after most
U.S. airlines implemented fee policies on the first two checked bags. Moreover,
although on-time performance estimates were available, most online reservation
services have not provided these data until recently. Thus, by using a 2012 survey
data, our study is a more recent reflection of the purchasing behavior of airline
customers.
3.3 Hypothesis Development
As any other organizations, airlines are interested in the satisfaction level of their
customers. One aspect that delights air customers is the on-time performance, often
used as a proxy for service quality, and one of the key performance indicators in
the airline industry. Although both departure performance and arrival performance
theoretically define the on-time performance of a flight, it is the arrival times that
can boost on-time rankings charted by the DOT. In ranking flight delays among
airlines, the DOT uses the percentage of flights with delayed arrivals. This measure is
widely reported by the media as the official metric of on-time performance of a flight.
Although the duration of delay is not factored in the on-time performance rankings,
the numbers can have a real influence on public perception. Suzuki [2000] suggests
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that travelers’ choice of airlines may be affected by the on-time arrival experience of
travelers. According to Mazzeo [2003, p. 277], the expected on-time performance is a
“key non-pecuniary component of an air traveler’s utility function. Such a consumer
would compare prices and expected on-time performance of the competing carriers
on the route for which he or she was buying a ticket. To the extent that consumers’
expectation of future delays are based on a carrier’s past on-time performance on that
route, one potential cost of flight delays for airlines is reduction in future demand.”
In this sense, Adler, Falzarano, and Spitz [2005] identify on-time performance as
an important selection criterion for travelers based on a stated-preference survey
conducted in 2003, when travelers did not have convenient access to this information
when booking a flight. In the recent years, the on-time performance of flights has
been used to influence customer bookings through its availability on airlines’ and
travel agencies’ websites.
Based on a 2001 survey of business travelers, Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006]
find that business travelers who check bags are less time-sensitive and subsequently
less impacted by on-time performance than business travelers who do not check bags.
We also expect this relationship to hold for leisure travelers (our respondents include
both business and leisure travelers). Thus, we suggest the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1A. The historical on-time performance of an itinerary has a
positive impact on the utility of that itinerary.
Hypothesis 1B. The historical on-time performance of an itinerary has a less
positive impact on the utility of that itinerary for customers who check bags versus
customers who do not check bags.
Airlines frequently pad their scheduled block times so that even late flights
technically arrive on time and boost the “on-time” performance records released to
the public [McCartney, 2007, 2010c]. However, this practice can frustrate passengers
who have to wait on board since the planes often arrive well before gates are
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available. Thus, from the customer standpoint, the most realistic schedule is the
most desirable [McCartney, 2010c]. In addition to realistic schedules, customers
prefer short-duration flights over long-duration flights on the same route.
As previously mentioned, Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006] find that business
travelers who check bags are less time-sensitive than business travelers who do not
check bags. They explain their finding through the additional time those business
travelers are willing to spend at the origin airport checking bags and then retrieving
them at the destination airport. We expect this finding to be true for leisure travelers
as well. Thus, the following hypotheses are suggested:
Hypothesis 2A. The total travel time of an itinerary has a negative impact on
the utility of that itinerary.
Hypothesis 2B. The total travel time of an itinerary has a less negative impact
on the utility of that itinerary for customers who check bags versus customers who do
not check bags.
Estimating customer price sensitivity from transaction data is problematic, as
customers may sometimes purchase a more expensive airfare only when the less
expensive airfares have been sold out [Hess, Adler, and Polak, 2007]. However,
this difficulty in retrieving significant effects for the airfare can be overcome by
stated-preference data which allows explicit specification of available alternatives.
Works such as Proussaloglou and Koppelman [1999], Adler, Falzarano, and Spitz
[2005], Theis, Adler, Clarke, and Ben-Akiva [2006], Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006],
Hess [2007], Pereira, Almeida, de Menezes, and Vieira [2007], Hess, Adler, and Polak
[2007], Hess [2008], Hess [2010], Wen and Lai [2010], and Collins, Rose, and Hess
[2012], have identified the negative impact of the airfare on the utility of an alternative
for all customers as well as different segments (business travelers, holiday travelers,
‘visiting friends and relatives’ travelers).
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It is generally understood that higher priced items trigger a higher price sensitivity
than lower priced items. Given that checked baggage fees increase the total cost of
travel, price sensitivity increases with the total cost. Thus, we expect those who check
bags to be more price sensitive to airfares than those who do not check bags, given
the higher total cost of travel. Travelers who do not personally pay for their travel,
including baggage fees (i.e. business travelers or flying using redeemed frequent flyer
points), may be less affected by the checked baggage fees than those who pay for
their travel and check bags. Moreover, given that an airline knows about a potential
customer whether or not she has historically checked bags, we expect travelers who
check bags but do not pay the corresponding fees and travelers who do not check bags
to share the same price sensitivity. Overall, however, we expect the airfare to have
a more negative impact on the choice of customers who check bags than customers
who do not check bags. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3A. The airfare of an itinerary has a negative impact on the utility
of that itinerary.
Hypothesis 3B. The airfare of an itinerary has a more negative impact on the
utility of that itinerary for customers who check bags and pay the associated fees versus
customers who do not check bags.
Hypothesis 3C. The airfare of an itinerary has a similar negative impact on the
utility of that itinerary for customers who check bags but do not pay the associated
fees versus customers who do not check bags.
Hypothesis 3D. The airfare of an itinerary has a more negative impact on the
utility of that itinerary for customers who check bags and pay the associated fees versus
customers who check bags but do not pay the associated fees.
The number of connections is another aspect considered by customers when
booking a trip. One commonly held belief among airline executives is that travelers
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prefer to avoid connections [Koppelman, Coldren, and Parker, 2008]. Graham,
Garrow, and Leonard [2010] find evidence consistent with the belief that business
travelers are more risk-adverse and/or time-sensitive on the outbound portion of
their trip, and thus are less willing to choose connection(s) due to increased travel
time and the additional risk that checked baggage may be delayed or lost. As Adler,
Falzarano, and Spitz [2005] point out, more connections increase travel time and can
negatively affect the on-time performance of the itinerary. In addition, connections
bring along risk and/or inconvenience. More specifically, if travelers check bags, we
expect them to show a higher sensitivity to the number of connections than those
who do not check bags due to the additional risk of mishandled baggage. In this
sense, an itinerary with connections may be more acceptable to travelers who do not
check bags than to those who check bags. On the other hand, given the benefit from
checking bags instead of inconveniently carrying them while disembarking, waiting
for a connection, and reboarding, we expect travelers who check bags to have a lower
sensitivity to the number of connections than those who do not check bags. Thus,
an itinerary with connections may be more acceptable to travelers who check bags
than to those who do not check bags.
The two opposite effects are not strong enough to support one hypothesis over
another, hence no direction can be offered on how travelers who check bags differ from
those who do not check bags with regard to the utility of the itinerary as influenced
by the number of connections. Thus, we suggest the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4A. The number of connections of an itinerary has a negative impact
on the utility of that itinerary.
Hypothesis 4B. The number of connections of an itinerary has a different impact
on the utility of that itinerary for customers who check bags versus customers who do
not check bags.
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual model
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Data
The data was generated by an Internet-based survey conducted by Resource Systems
Group, Inc. in Spring 2012. An overview of the survey is provided in Figure 3.2.
A total of 878 U.S. domestic travelers were surveyed on their most recent air travel
experience. The qualified respondents have made a paid air trip within the last
six months. The survey probed the respondents regarding their ticket purchasing
attitude and experience, including the purchasing time relative to the trip date, level
of satisfaction during the purchasing experience, and amount paid for the ticket.
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Further, flight related information was collected, such as: the origin and destination
airports, trip purpose, number of party members, trip length, number of checked and
carry-on bags, baggage fees cost, on-time arrival performance, airline that flew the
flight, aircraft type, number of connections, total travel time, flight quality, level of
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Figure 3.2 Overview of RSG survey
Thus, the survey used the actual flight information to provide a reference trip,
i.e. the revealed preference trip. Next, discrete choice scenarios were built based
on the outbound portion of the revealed preference trip, to capture responses to
choice situations or so-called stated preferences. The scenarios were designed to
trade off alternative flight options on the airline, aircraft type, flight departure and
arrival times, number of connections, flight time (including connection times), on-time
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  Which of these two alternatives would you have preferred on your trip from the General Lawrence   
  Logan International Airport (BOS) to the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)?   
          
  Note: Flight information may change from screen to screen.   
          
    
Option A Option B 
  
  
Airline Delta Air Lines United Airlines 
  
  
Aircraft Type Standard Jet Widebody Jet 
  
  
Flight Departure Time 9:15 AM Eastern Time 7:20 AM Eastern Time 
  
  
Number of Connections Direct flight 1 connection 
  
  
Total Travel Time 8 hours and 15 minutes 9 hours and 10 minutes 
  
  
Flight Arrival Time 2:30 PM Pacific Time 1:30 PM Pacific Time 
  
  
On-Time Performance 60% of these flights are on time 70% of these flights are on time 
  
  
One-Way Fare $180  $315  
  
  
Select one: ○ ○ 
  
      (Question 6 of 8)   
Figure 3.3 Stated-preference survey: screen-shot example
performance, and airfare. Each respondent was asked to make a choice in each of
eight binomial choice sets. A choice-set example is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
As respondents had previously indicated their three preferred airlines and their
least preferred airline from a list of 24 airlines (under the assumption of equal fares),
the scenarios included airlines from this set of four. Four different types of aircraft
(propeller, regional jet, etc.) were included in the scenarios. Table 3.1 shows the
attributes and levels of the stated preference experiment.
In total, 7,024 choice sets were collected. Unlike previous studies, neither choice
coincided with the revealed preference trip, avoiding non-trading and excessive point
formation issues [Hess, 2008, Hess, Rose, and Polak, 2010]. As some respondents
did not provide their frequent flyer membership status with specific airlines, the
sample size was reduced to 6,996 choices between two itineraries resulting in 13,992
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Table 3.1 Attributes and levels characterizing the itinerary in the stated preference
experiment
Attribute Definition and Level
Airline Based on previously collected preferences (1st, 2nd, 3rd, least preferred
airline)
Aircraft type Propeller, regional jet, standard jet, widebody jet
Departure time Departure time of itinerary
Arrival time Arrival time of itinerary
Number of connections Nonstop (0), one stop, two stops
Flight time Total departure to arrival gate time (realistic values which varied based on
design)
On-time performance Percentage of times the flight itinerary is on time (60%, 70%, 80%, 90%)
Airfare Based on airfare of revelead preference trip (-40%, -20%, +20%, +40%)
observations (half chosen and half not chosen). Further, the final sample size was
reduced to 12,216 observations corresponding only to respondents who flied economy
class (i.e. only 1,776 of 13,992 observations correspond to respondents who flied
business class) on their revealed-preference trip.
In addition to the stated-preference experiment, the respondents were asked to
rate 5-point Likert scale (from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) statements
such as “I generally shop for the cheapest flights and do not consider other factors”,
etc. Finally, the survey collected demographics information such as the respondents’
frequent flyer status, gender, age, income, and employment. Table 3.2 provides a
breakdown of the sample. Thus, 35% of the respondents were aged under 34, 44%
were aged between 35 and 54, and the remaining respondents were over 55 years
old. The majority (77%) of respondents were working, either full-time (60%), part-
time (7%), or self-employed (10%). With regard to the annual household income,
27% of respondents had under $50,000 annual income, while 41% of the respondents
had annual income between $50,000 and $100,000, and 32% had annual income over
$100,000.
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Table 3.2 Demographics of respondents
Percentage
Age
34 or under 35
Between 35-54 44








$49,999 or less 27
Between $50,000-$99,999 41




A breakdown of the sample by the airline indicated by the respondents in the
revealed-preference trip is provided in Table 3.3. This profile is representative of
the overall U.S. air travel market in 2012, as described by the following market
shares based on the percentage of airline customers on U.S. carriers: 15% - American
Airlines; Delta Air Lines - 22%; Southwest Airlines - 18%; United Airlines &
Continental Airlines - 19%; US Airways - 9%; all others - 17% [CNN Money, 2013].
Table 3.3 The revealed-preference trips by airline
Airline Percentage Airline Percentage
AirTran Airways 3.42 JetBlue Airways 7.52
Air Canada 0.23 Pinnacle Airlines 0.11
Alaska Airlines 1.71 Southwest Airlines 21.98
Allegiant Air 0.46 Spirit Airlines 0.46
American Airlines 13.44 Sun Country Airlines 0.46
American Eagle 1.03 United Airlines 10.25
Continental Airlines 6.04 United Express 0.68
Delta Air Lines 19.48 US Airways 6.15
Delta Connection 1.25 US Airways Express 0.34
Frontier Airlines 2.62 Virgin America 0.91
Hawaiian Airlines 1.03 Others 0.46
61
3.4.2 Model
The most common research on air travel choice behavior relies on discrete choice
models that are based on random utility theory [Train, 2003, Greene, 2008]. Utility
can be defined as the ‘value’ placed by an individual on different attributes,
thus capturing how trade-offs are made among different attributes. Random
utility theory is based on the hypothesis that every individual is a rational
decision-maker, maximizing utility relative to his/her choices. The utility assigned
by the decision-maker to an alternative is not known with certainty by the analyst,
and consequently must be represented by a random variable. The statistical model
is driven by the probability that the individual chooses the alternative with the
maximum utility among the j choices, which is the essence of one of the most
common discrete choice models, i.e. multinomial logit (MNL) model [McFadden,
1974].
Thus, we employ a MNL model and test a standard specification for the base
model, with parameters entering the utility function in a linear fashion. Although the
stated choice experiments offer the advantage of exact information on all attributes
presented to the respondent, it is still possible that the respondent’s choice is also
influenced by factors not presented during the experiments [Hess, 2010]. Thus, two
dummy variables accounting for the effects of frequent flyer (FF) membership, i.e.
basic membership and elite membership, are included in the model (no membership
is the base level and thus excluded). Given the negative impact of schedule delay,
i.e. the difference between desired and offered departure times [Proussaloglou and
Koppelman, 1995, 1999, Algers and Beser, 2001, Parker and Walker, 2005], we capture
this effect by introducing two schedule delay variables in the utility function, i.e.
Early-departure (if the alternative flight departs earlier than the revealed preference
flight) and Late-departure (if the alternative flight departs later than the revealed
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preference flight). Our base model is as follows:
Uj =βA−w ∗ δAircraft-widebody,j + βA−r−j ∗ δAircraft-regional-jet,j + βA−p ∗ δAircraft-propeller,j+
βA−r1 ∗ δAirline-rank1,j + βA−r2−r3 ∗ δAirline-rank2-rank3,j + βFF−b ∗ δFF-basic,j+
βFF−e ∗ δFF-elite,j + βE−d ∗ δEarly-departure,j + βL−d ∗ δLate-departure,j+
βOT−P ∗OnTime-Perfj + βT−T ∗ Travel-Timej + βA ∗ Airfarej+
βN−of−C ∗ No-of-Connectionsj (3.1)
where j=1,2.
Parameters βT−T and βA are marginal utility coefficients that capture the utility
associated with an increase by 1 hour in travel time, respectively $100 in airfare1.
βOT−P relates to the on-time performance (in four levels percentage points) of an
itinerary, while βN−of−C refers to the number of connections of the itinerary. The
aircraft type is defined by δAircraft−widebody, δAircraft−regional−jet, δAircraft−standard−jet,
and δAircraft−propeller dummy variables, where δAircraft−standard−jet is the base level, and
thus not included in the model. Finally, the three most preferred airlines are defined
by δAirline−rank1 and δAirline−rank2−rank3 dummy variables, whereas δAirline−rank4
dummy variable has been left out of the model as it defines the least preferred airline
as the reference.
While there may be some collinearity among the OnTime-Performance, Travel-
Time, Airfare and No-of-Connections variables, we evaluate whether the inclusion of
each one is statistically validated and results in a better model fit. In this sense we
conduct several nested likelihood ratio tests2 [Garrow, 2010]. These tests are used
to compare two models, where one model can be written as a restricted version of a
1When shown to the respondents in the stated-preference experiments, the Travel-Time and
Airfare variables were expressed in minutes, respectively $. However, for an easier interpretation of
the results, we rescaled them in our analyses, i.e. the Travel-Time is expressed in hours, while the
Airfare is expressed in $’00.
2All the analyses in this study are conducted using Stata 12.
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different model. Thus, in a restricted model some parameters are set to zero and/or
one or more parameters are set equal to each other. The null hypothesis of a nested
likelihood ratio test is:
H0 : Model1 (restricted) = Model2 (unrestricted)
and the decision rule that rejects the null hypothesis is:
−2 ∗ [LLR − LLU)] > critical value from χ2NR,α distribution
where:
LLR = the log likelihood of the restricted model
LLU = the log likelihood of the unrestricted model
NR = the number of restrictions
α = the statistical significance level
If the nested likelihood ratio tests rejects the null hypothesis, it is an indication that
the restrictions are not valid, and the unrestricted model is preferred.
Table 3.4 reports the results of four nested likelihood ratio tests (based on
MNL models). The first two tests evaluate whether the improvement in the log
likelihood of a joint model with Travel-Time and No-of-Connections as main
variables outperforms the single Travel-Time and No-of-Connections models. Given
the previously mentioned decision rule of the nested likelihood ratio test, Table 3.4
shows that the inclusion of both Travel-Time and No-of-Connections in the joint
model results in a better model fit (p=0.05) than both Travel-Time model and
No-of-Connections model. Thus, although the travel time and number of connections
may be correlated (i.e. more connections increase travel time), their presence in the
same model still results in significant t-statistics and improves the model fit such
that it is statistically recommended to include both, not one, in the model.
The next two tests in Table 3.4 evaluate whether the improvement in the log

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































main variables is superior to the single No-of-Connections and OnTime-Performance
models. The results indicate that the inclusion of both No-of-Connections and
OnTime-Performance in the joint model results in a better model fit (p=0.05)
than both No-of-Connections model and No-of-Connections model. Thus, although
the number of connections and on-time performance may be correlated (i.e. more
connections can negatively affect the on-time performance of the itinerary), their
inclusion in the same model is statistically warranted.
Similar to Table 3.4, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the results of additional nested
likelihood ratio tests (based on MNL models). First, we find that the joint model
with No-of-Connections and Airfare as main variables results in a better model fit
(p=0.05) than both the No-of-Connections model and the Airfare model. Thus,
although the number of connections of an itinerary and the airfare of that itinerary
may be correlated, i.e. a direct flight is more expensive than an one-connection flight,
both No-of-Connections and Airfare can be simultaneously included in the model.
Then we find statistical support (p=0.05) for the concurrent presence of Travel-Time
and OnTime-Performance in the model, in spite of the fact that these variables may
be correlated (i.e. a longer travel time of the itinerary can deteriorate its on-time
performance).
Next, Table 3.6 shows that the inclusion of both Travel-Time and Airfare in the
joint model results in an improved model fit (p=0.05) than both Travel-Time model
and Airfare model. That is, although the travel time and airfare of an itinerary
may be correlated, their simultaneous inclusion in the model is statistically justified.
Finally, we find that the joint model with OnTime-Performance and Airfare as main
variables results in a better model fit (p=0.05) than both the OnTime-Performance
model and the Airfare model. Thus, although correlation may exist between the
airfare and on-time performance as an expensive airfare on an itinerary can be justified







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































likelihood ratio tests indicate that it is statistically recommended to include both
OnTime-Performance and Airfare in the model.
To distinguish between travelers who check bags and those who do not check
bags, we allow for separate coefficients in the same model3. More specifically, we
create interactions between the OnTime-Performance, Travel-Time, Airfare, No-
of-Connections variables and whether the traveler checks bags or not. Thus, the
heterogeneous4 OnTime-Perf model is as follows:
Uj =βA−w ∗ δAircraft-widebody,j + βA−r−j ∗ δAircraft-regional-jet,j + βA−p ∗ δAircraft-propeller,j+
βA−r1 ∗ δAirline-rank1,j + βA−r2−r3 ∗ δAirline-rank2-rank3,j + βFF−b ∗ δFF-basic,j+
βFF−e ∗ δFF-elite,j + βE−d ∗ δEarly-departure,j + βL−d ∗ δLate-departure,j+
βT−T ∗ Travel-Timej + βA ∗ Airfarej + βN−of−C ∗ No-of-Connectionsj+
βOT−P∗C ∗ (OnTime-Perfj ∗ Check) + βOT−P∗NC ∗ (OnTime-Perfj ∗NoCheck)
(3.2)
where j=1,2.
Similarly, we employ heterogeneous Travel-Time, No-of-Connections, and Airfare
models. In the heterogeneous Airfare model we also factor in whether travelers
who check bags, pay the associated checked baggage fees or not. This becomes
an important distinction when measuring the total travel cost. Finally, the
heterogeneous pooled model includes all the interaction terms, as follows:
Uj =βA−w ∗ δAircraft-widebody,j + βA−r−j ∗ δAircraft-regional-jet,j + βA−p ∗ δAircraft-propeller,j+
βA−r1 ∗ δAirline-rank1,j + βA−r2−r3 ∗ δAirline-rank2-rank3,j + βFF−b ∗ δFF-basic,j+
3We also ran the base model using two datasets, i.e. comprising travelers who check bags and
travelers who do not check bags. However, the absolute magnitude of parameter estimates cannot
be compared across different datasets [Garrow, 2010], and therefore we assess the support or lack
of support of the corresponding hypotheses based on heterogeneous single and pooled models, as
mentioned next.
4We use this terminology to account for the distinction between travelers who check bags and
travelers who do not check bags included in the model.
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βFF−e ∗ δFF-elite,j + βE−d ∗ δEarly-departure,j + βL−d ∗ δLate-departure,j+
βOT−P∗C ∗ (OnTime-Perfj ∗ Check) + βOT−P∗NC ∗ (OnTime-Perfj ∗NoCheck)+
βT−T∗C ∗ (Travel-Timej ∗ Check) + βT−T∗NC ∗ (Travel-Timej ∗NoCheck)+
βA∗C&NPF ∗ (Airfarej ∗ Check&NoPaidFees)+
βA∗C&PF ∗ (Airfarej ∗ Check&PaidFees)+
βA∗NC ∗ (Airfarej ∗NoCheck) + βN−of−C∗C ∗ (No-of-Connectionsj ∗ Check)+
βN−of−C∗NC ∗ (No-of-Connectionsj ∗NoCheck) (3.3)
where j=1,2.
3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Confirming Previous Results
The results5 of our base model in Eq.3.1 are shown in Table 3.7. The model shows
the expected positive effect of OnTime-Perf on the choice probability of an itinerary
(e.g., Wen and Lai [2010], Hess [2010], Teichert, Shehu, and von Wartburg [2008]),
which confirms hypothesis H1A. That is, an increase in the value of OnTime-Perf will
increase the utility of that flight option (and thus the probability of being chosen),
all else being equal. More specifically, if the OnTime-Perf increases by 1%, the odds
of choosing that flight option are multiplied by 1.0175. Next, we find the expected
negative effects of Travel-Time (e.g., Collins, Rose, and Hess [2012], Hess [2008]),
Airfare (e.g., Wen and Lai [2010], Teichert, Shehu, and von Wartburg [2008], Pereira,
Almeida, de Menezes, and Vieira [2007], Proussaloglou and Koppelman [1999]), and
No-of-Connections (e.g., Collins, Rose, and Hess [2012], Hess [2010]) on the choice
probability of an itinerary, which confirm hypotheses H2A, H3A, and H4A. A negative
5Given the assumption of constant tastes across choices for the same respondent, the standard
errors reported in this study account for the correlations among the stated-preference experiments
through clustering at the respondent level.
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Table 3.7 MNL: Base model results
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error Odds Ratio
Aircraft type (Reference = standard jet)
Widebody -0.5452*** 0.1041 0.5797
Regional jet 0.3048*** 0.0554 1.3564
Propeller 0.5399*** 0.0890 1.7159
Airline preference (Reference = least preferred)
Airline-rank 1 0.9418*** 0.0820 2.5646
Airline-rank 2 or 3 0.8785*** 0.0653 2.4072
FF (Reference = no membership)
Basic 0.1719** 0.0670 1.1876
Elite 0.4103*** 0.1535 1.5073
Schedule delay
Early departure -0.0010*** 0.0003 0.9990
Late departure -0.0000 0.0003 1.0000
OnTime-Perf 0.0173*** 0.0021 1.0175
Travel-Time -0.2430*** 0.0431 0.7843
Airfare -0.7411*** 0.0793 0.4766
No-of-Connections -0.7136*** 0.0698 0.4899
Likelihood Ratio χ2(d.f.) 2382.87(13)
Pseudo R-square 0.2814
Log Likelihood (LL) -3042.31
Note: Number of observations = 12,216
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
coefficient indicates that an increase in the value of that variable will decrease the
utility of that flight option, all else being equal. More specifically, our results indicate
that if the Travel-Time increases by 1 hour, then a traveler is 0.7843 times less likely
to choose that flight option. Or if the Airfare increases by $100, then a traveler is
0.4766 times less likely to choose that flight option. As regards the No-of-Connections,
the results indicate that an additional connection decreases the odds of choosing that
flight option by 51%.
With regard to the airline preference, Table 3.7 reports that travelers prefer mostly
itineraries associated with their first-ranked airline, followed by those associated with
their second- and third-ranked preferences, relative to itineraries with least preferred
airlines. This finding is consistent with Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006] who only
examine the choice behavior of business travelers. Similarly, the finding that travelers
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prefer itineraries that include airlines with which they are frequent flyers (where the
loyalty effect is higher for the elite members than for the basic members) confirms
previous studies (e.g. Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006], Theis, Adler, Clarke, and
Ben-Akiva [2006], Hess [2008]). Finally, the negative and significant coefficient of the
schedule delay variable Early-departure indicates travelers’ reluctance to deviate from
the departure time of their reference flight. This finding is in line with Proussaloglou
and Koppelman [1999] who find a greater sensitivity associated with early departure
than with late departure flights, whereby their measure of schedule delay reflects the
inconvenience of traveling at a time other than the preferred departure time.
The results of the heterogeneous models based on Eq.3.2 are shown in Tables
3.8 and 3.9, while Table 3.10 reports the results of the heterogeneous pooled model
based on Eq.3.3. In these models, the aircraft type, airline preference, frequent flyer
status, and schedule delay variables exhibit similar results as previously discussed.
In addition, the parameter estimates of OnTime-Perf, Travel-Time, Airfare, and
No-of-Connections variables show the expected effects, and thus provide additional
support for hypotheses H1A, H2A, H3A, and H4A.
3.5.2 Are Travelers Who Check Bags Different Than Those Who Do
Not Check Bags?
As Table 3.8 shows, the heterogeneous OnTime-Perf model reports a positive and
statistically significant OnTime-Perf coefficient for travelers who check bags (0.0179;
p<0.01), which exceeds the OnTime-Perf coefficient for travelers who do not check
bags (0.0162; p<0.01). However, the nested log likelihood test indicates that the
heterogeneous OnTime-Perf model fit does not improve over that of the base model.
Thus, we cannot distinguish between travelers who check bags and travelers who do
not check bags based on their sensitivity to on-time performance, and so we do not























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The heterogeneous Travel-Time model in Table 3.8 shows negative and
statistically significant (p<0.01) coefficients of interaction terms, i.e. -0.2113
Travel-Time coefficient for travelers who check bags, and -0.3269 Travel-Time
coefficient for travelers who do not check bags. The nested log likelihood test
indicates that the heterogeneous Travel-Time model fit improves over that of the base
model. All else being equal, the odds that a customer who checks bags will choose
the itinerary with a 60-minute longer total travel time are reduced by approximately
19%, as compared to a reduction of approximately 28% for a customer who does
not check bags. Thus, customers who check bags appear to be significantly less
sensitive to the total travel time of an itinerary than customers who do not check
bags. Our study finds support for hypothesis H2B, and hence extends the work of
Warburg, Bhat, and Adler [2006] who find the same relationship for business travelers
only. Therefore, an airline with most of its customers checking bags should be less
concerned about inflated flight schedules and could schedule longer connecting times.
Moreover, investments in flying additional flights and shortening the connecting
times would be less effective for an airline with most of its customers checking bags.
The coefficients of interaction terms in the heterogeneous Airfare model (Table
3.9) are negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). More specifically, we find that
travelers who check bags but do not pay the associated baggage fees (as a benefit of
the frequent flyer status or because they do not exist in case of Southwest Airlines
and JetBlue Airways) are the most sensitive to the airfare (-1.1158), followed by the
travelers who do not check bags (-0.8860), while the travelers who check bags and pay
the associated baggage fees are the least sensitive to the airfare (-0.5543). The nested
log likelihood test indicates that the heterogeneous Airfare model fit improves over
that of the base model. However, we do not find support for hypothesis H3B since the
airfare has a more negative impact on the itinerary utility for travelers who do not























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the odds that a customer who checks bags and pay the corresponding fees will choose
the itinerary with a $100 more expensive airfare are reduced by approximately 43%,
compared to 59% for customers who do not check bags, all else being equal.
We also find that travelers who check bags but do not pay the corresponding fees
are more sensitive to the airfare than those who do not check bags, which indicates
lack of support for hypothesis H3C. All else being equal, the odds that a customer
who checks bags and does not pay the corresponding fees will choose the itinerary
with a $100 more expensive airfare are reduced by approximately 67% in comparison
with 59% for customers who do not check bags. Similarly, the results indicate that
the odds that a customer who checks bags and pay the corresponding fees will choose
the itinerary with a $100 more expensive airfare are reduced by approximately 43%,
compared to 67% for customers who check bags but do not pay the corresponding
fees, all else being equal. That is, we do not find support for hypothesis H3D as we
find a more negative impact of the airfare on the itinerary utility for travelers who
check bags but do not pay the associated fees versus travelers who check bags and pay
the associated fees. Thus, our results indicate that travelers who check bags and pay
the associated fees are the least price sensitive, and hence, more valuable customers.
Given this, the airlines should seek to increase the size of this segment of customers,
by offering perks or rewards (e.g., higher ranking on priority list for upgrades, offering
discount when the traveler pre-pays for checked baggage when checking-in online,
etc.). On the other hand, if the airlines make checking bags more of a hassle, they
could be driving away their more profitable customers.
The heterogeneous No-of-Connections in Table 3.9 reports a negative and
statistically significant No-of-Connections coefficient for travelers who check bags
(-0.6637; p<0.01), which exceeds the No-of-Connections coefficient for travelers who
do not check bags (-0.8443; p<0.01). All else being equal, the odds that a customer
who checks bags will choose the itinerary with an additional connection are reduced
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Table 3.10 MNL: Heterogeneous pooled model results
Model:
Pooled
Variable Parameter Standard Odds
Estimate Error Ratio
Aircraft type (Reference = standard jet)
Widebody -0.5470*** 0.1061 0.5787
Regional jet 0.309*** 0.0568 1.3621
Propeller 0.5461*** 0.0903 1.7265
Airline preference (Reference = least preferred)
Airline-rank 1 0.9522*** 0.0828 2.5913
Airline-rank 2 or 3 0.8884*** 0.0666 2.4312
FF (Reference = no membership)
Basic 0.1667** 0.0679 1.1813
Elite 0.4460*** 0.1588 1.5621
Schedule delay
Early departure -0.001*** 0.0003 0.9990
Late departure 0.0000 0.0003 1.0000
OnTime-Perf 0.0177*** 0.0021 1.0178
Travel-Time * Check -0.2219*** 0.0513 0.8010
Travel-Time * NoCheck -0.3093*** 0.0809 0.7340
Airfare * Check & NoPaidFees -1.0967*** 0.1036 0.3340
Airfare * Check & PaidFees -0.5455*** 0.0990 0.5795
Airfare * NoCheck -0.9231*** 0.1350 0.3973
No-of-Connections * Check -0.6872*** 0.0799 0.5030
No-of-Connections * NoCheck -0.8102*** 0.1406 0.4448
Likelihood Ratio χ2(d.f.) 2463.55(17)
Pseudo R-square 0.2909
Log Likelihood (LL) -3001.97
Number of Restrictions (NR) 4
−2 ∗ (LLBase−model − LL) 80.68
χ2NR,0.05 9.49
Note: Number of observations = 12,216.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
by approximately 49%. This compares to a reduction in the odds for a customer
who does not check bags of approximately 57%. The nested log likelihood test
indicates that the heterogeneous No-of-Connections model fit improves over that
of the base model. Thus, we find support for hypothesis H4B as the number of
connections has a different impact on the itinerary utility for travelers who check
bags versus those who do not. It appears that travelers who do not check bags have
a stronger preference for fewer connections, while those who check bags may not
be as concerned about the increased risk of mishandled baggage associated with a
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higher number of connections. The fact that in 2012 U.S. airlines reported the lowest
mishandled baggage rate in 18 years [BTS Press Release, February 2013] supports
this view of a decreased risk of mishandled baggage. Similar to total travel time, an
airline who has a larger percentage of customers who check bags will gain less from
reducing the number of connections or offering more direct flights than an airline
with fewer customers who check bags.
Finally, the nested log likelihood test indicates that the heterogeneous pooled
model fit improves over that of the base model. Thus, the heterogeneous pooled
model (Table 3.10)6 confirms the previously found support for hypotheses H2B and
H4B, and rejects hypotheses H3B, H3C, and H3D. A summary of our findings is
provided in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11 Hypotheses results
Hypothesis Result
H1: On-Time Performance
A: positive impact supported
B: checking bags vs. no checking bags not supported
H2: Travel Time
A: negative impact supported
B: checking bags vs. no checking bags supported
H3: Airfare
A: negative impact supported
B: checking bags & paying fees vs. no checking bags opposite supported
C: checking bags & not paying fees vs. no checking bags opposite supported
D: checking bags & paying fees vs. checking bags & not paying fees opposite supported
H4: Number of Connections
A: negative impact supported
B: checking bags vs. no checking bags supported
3.6 Conclusions
This paper portrays a clear picture of the key factors that influence itinerary choice,
by using stated-preference data collected in the U.S. in the Spring of 2012. In support
6Since we previously found that we cannot distinguish between travelers who check bags and
travelers who do not check bags based on their sensitivity to on-time performance, we included the
main effect OnTime-Perf.
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of many previous studies, our analyses confirm the important role played by attributes
such as historical on-time performance (with its positive effect) and total travel time,
airfare, and number of connections (with their negative effects) on itinerary-choice
behavior. Our models were estimated on all 12,216 observations, as opposed to using a
segmentation along a socio-demographic dimension such as trip purpose, which it has
traditionally been done in the air travel research. We contribute to extant literature
by exploring a new dimension for segmenting airline travelers. Since airlines are
interested in determining whether they should change their operations policies and
spend more or less resources to make it easier or harder for customers to check bags,
we provide a tool for this decision by explaining a potential new way of segmenting
travelers based on their sensitivities to itinerary attributes.
An important avenue for air travel research comes in the use of a combination of
revealed-preference and stated-preference data [Algers and Beser, 2001]. As such, we
use interactions between an attribute disclosed in the revealed-preference data and
the sensitivity to travel attributes from stated-preference data. By distinguishing
between customer segments, we show that, as compared to travelers who do not check
bags, travelers who check bags are more valuable as they are less price sensitive and
less likely to choose an itinerary flown by a different airline because of a shorter total
travel time or because of fewer connections. This finding clearly indicates that airlines,
in their pursuit to reduce costs, cannot afford hurting the experience of customers
who check bags by cutting corners on such a complex operational process as handling
bags: “Moving passenger baggage is an intensely manual operation, requiring lots of
workers. On average, each bag gets touched by about 10 workers during its journey.
Once bags are tagged, they are sorted and placed on carts, then driven planeside,
where a crew loads them into the belly of a jet. The unloading process is more labor-
intensive: Bags are sorted into luggage to be delivered to the carousel for passengers
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to collect and luggage that needs to be routed to connecting flights and has to be
sorted and driven to lots of different planes” [McCartney, 2008d].
One implication of this finding is that airlines should actively engage in the
acquisition and retention of customers who check bags in general, and especially
customers who check bags and pay the associated fees. This contradicts one of
airlines’ widely held beliefs about the relative importance of customers who check
bags. Specifically, our discussion with a major airline revealed that they believe that
travelers who check bags and pay the associated fees are the airline’s least valuable
customers. Checking bags and paying the corresponding fees equates to not enjoying
the elite frequent flyer status. Thus, the airlines attach a lower trip frequency to
these travelers, hence a high price sensitivity.
In this study, only multinomial logit structures are used. We estimate our models
using a clustered sandwich estimator to allow for intra-respondent correlation, and
thus take into account the repeated choice nature of the stated-preference data. In
addition to service attributes, it is likely that individual characteristics and trip
context affect itinerary choices. It is also reasonable to assume that some preference
heterogeneity exists within the sample, and recovering this heterogeneity remains an
area for future work. A mixture model such as mixed logit relaxes the assumption
that all individuals in a given segment have identical preferences, which is assumed
in the widely used multinomial logit models. However, the use of mixed logit model
that identifies and accounts for variations in individual and context preferences across
the sample is warranted as long as it shows additional gain in model fit.
Latent class modeling accounts for preference heterogeneity across individuals
as well. However, as opposed to the assumption of continuous random variations
in taste parameters used by the mixed logit model, the latent class model uses a
discrete distribution [Greene and Hensher, 2003]. Future research using a post-
segmentation method based on latent class model with travelers’ demographic and
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trip characteristics in the segment membership can improve our understanding of
air travelers’ preferences. By recognizing segments’ characteristics and differential
sensitivity to service attributes, airlines can establish effective marketing strategy and




The studies within this dissertation were conducted to provide new empirical evidence
related to the baggage fees policies implemented by most U.S. airlines in 2008, and
to the itinerary-choice behavior of travelers who check or do not check bags. More
specifically, in Essay 1 we investigate the operational impact of the baggage fee
policies, while in Essay 2 we explore the additional benefits that the service of checking
bags provides to the airlines aside from the obvious revenue increase from the fees.
In Essay 1 we find that at the aggregate level, the airlines that began charging
for one checked bag saw a significant relative improvement in their on-time departure
performance in the 35-day period afterwards, compared to the airlines that were
not charging for a checked bag during the same time period. When grouped into
‘low-cost’ versus ‘legacy’ carriers, however, we find opposite effects: the departure
performance of the low-cost airlines became worse while it improved for the legacy
carriers. When the airlines began charging for two checked bags, we find no significant
change in departure performance of legacy carriers, but a degradation of departure
performance of low-cost carriers. These findings indicate that the baggage fees did
influence customer behavior, but in the case of charging for both checked bags, not in
the direction the airlines had hoped for. The degradation of departure performance
appears to be especially bad for the low-cost carriers, as it appears that their more
price sensitive passengers may have begun carrying on more baggage to avoid the
checked bag fees. Thus, our findings also support the notion that Southwest Airlines’
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marketing strategy of being the only major U.S. airline not charging for the first two
checked bags is in line with their historical operations oriented strategy.
In Essay 2 we find additional support for the impact of key factors such as the
on-time performance, travel time, airfare, and number of connections on the choice
probability of an itinerary. However, although our study supports the premise that
monitoring and improving on-time performance is among the strategies adopted by air
carriers to increase product differentiation and obtain market advantage, the results
indicate that travelers who check bags do not appear to value on-time performance
any more or less than those who do not check bags. Regarding the total travel time,
we identify the higher likelihood of travelers who check bags versus those who do not
check bags to choose an itinerary with a higher travel time. For the airlines with
more customers who check bags than customers who do not check bags, this finding
translates to less concern about the impact of padded flight schedules on customers’
satisfaction.
Next, we find a more negative impact of the airfare on the itinerary utility for
travelers who do not check bags relative to travelers who check bags and pay the
associated fees. Our results also indicate that travelers who check bags but do not
pay the corresponding fees are more sensitive to the airfare than those who do not
check bags. We also find a more negative impact of the airfare on the itinerary utility
for travelers who check bags but do not pay the associated fees versus travelers who
check bags and pay the associated fees. Thus, it appears that travelers who check
bags and pay the associated fees are more valuable customers due to their lowest
sensitivity to price. As such, instead of making checking bags more of a hassle that
could be driving away these valuable customers, the airlines could offer them perks or
rewards, such as higher ranking on priority list for upgrades, offering discount when
the traveler pre-pays for checked baggage when checking-in online, etc. Finally, we
find that travelers who check bags are less sensitive to the number of connections of
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their itinerary, which are more acceptable due to the convenience factor of having
bags checked. Thus, it appears that travelers who do not check bags have a stronger
preference for fewer connections.
To conclude, this dissertation contributes to three streams of research, as follows:
(1) research that uses data provided by the DOT to investigate the impact of
various factors on the quality dimension of airline’s operational performance, as
measured by on-time departures, on-time arrivals, flight cancellations, and the
impact of service quality dimensions on financial performance, (2) research that
examines the consequences of implementing baggage fees, and (3) research on air
travel choice behavior that models airline service trade-offs in air itinerary choices
using stated-preference survey methodology. Our results in Essay 1 emphasize the
impact of checked baggage fees policies on departure performance, while the results
in Essay 2 lead to the conclusion that travelers who check bags are more valuable
to the airlines than travelers who do not check bags. Future research could examine
whether the implementation of checked baggage fees reduced the probability of
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